Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Revisiting James Fallows' "Muscle-Bound Superpower"

The Military Reform Movement was a post-Vietnam War grouping of servicepersons, civilian defense officials, non-governmental experts, sympathetic politicians and their allies in the media which, significantly in response to the perceived failures of the U.S. armed forces' approach to the conflict in Southeast Asia, challenged the military-industrial "Establishment"'s practices. Bringing together elements from the Pentagon Fighter Mafia," to the Neo-Liberals of the Democratic Party and the bipartisan Congressional Military Reform Caucus, to journalists like James Fallows, it was prominent in the late 1970s and 1980s, but faded away quickly afterward, after having enjoyed little practical influence on the relevant decisions even in the peak years of its visibility and very little to show for itself in the way of a legacy afterward (some input into the design of particular fighter aircraft, the "cult" of Air Force officer John Boyd, etc.), with this having its reflection in the slightness of the attention to it since. However, even if the Movement's results were slight given its relevance to the history of the American discourse about national security, its connections with numerous important tendencies within American political history more broadly (e.g. Democratic Party Neo-Liberalism), and the general understanding of institutional responses to military defeat and pressures for change in its wake; the lack of discussion of the Movement would seem a problematic gap in the scholarly literature. As a contribution to redressing that gap the author presents here an examination of James Fallows' October 1979 article in The Atlantic magazine, "Muscle-Bound Superpower: The State of America's Defense," which introduced the movement to the public, as significantly representative of the Movement's range of policy concern, suggested courses of action, and intellectual premises, with an eye to what they meant for its ultimate results.

In taking on the matter of what Fallows described as "the muscle-bound superpower," and the practices that made it so, Fallows foregrounded the question of whether America was getting "good value for the money" it spent on defense--and answered the question in the negative. His explanation for that unhappy state of affairs was the influence of three policymakers whose genuine insights, reasonable objectives and sensible aspirations calcified into a hegemony of flawed ideas within the making of defense policy. These were, namely, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his promotion of private sector-style efficiency-minded "managerialism" within defense policymaking commonly accused of being remote from battlefield realities; "father of the nuclear navy" Admiral Hyman Rickover, who had championed a "technologism" that seized upon the fullest exploitation of technical possibility without regard for other factors, leading to programs delivering smaller and smaller numbers of increasingly costly, complex and unreliable systems at the expense of every other military need; and longtime, many-hatted Washington "insider" Paul Nitze, who promoted a "Strangelovian" pursuit of the chimera of "winnable" nuclear war--in Fallows' phrase "the thought of" unthinkable "nuclear war," with all its own incentive to pursuing dubious technological possibility, ever-larger and more variegated forces, etc. in pursuit of an impossible goal at a very high cost.

Against managerialism, Fallows offered a return to training officers "for combat, not management"; against technologism a "triage system for weapons" dispensing with what was not actually likely to be useful in either the "low-grade" threat scenarios in which the U.S. confronted limited opponents, or the "big war" scenario of a clash with the Soviets (in which category Fallows classed, for example, the Navy's AEGIS radar-equipped warships); and against the thought of nuclear war an end to preoccupation with the more extreme "hypotheticals" of "nuclear strategy" (like the "What ifs?" about the survivability of the actually well-protected Minuteman Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile silos), and concentration on the highly survivable sea-based portion of the country's nuclear deterrent.* Fallows also more broadly suggested the United States "get more help from our allies," and most radically of all, that the U.S. limit the portion of its armed forces not devoted to the Europe-centered NATO mission of defending Western Europe from Soviet attack to "a modest policing force" for "a very short-term, limited policing and peacekeeping function"--with this not only a matter of saving money by not bothering with a "capability" from which the country will not benefit, but heading off the mistake of "another Vietnam" by ruling out such interventions for simple lack of the means.6 (As Fallows puts it the U.S. armed force were structured for "a war and a half," with the "war" the hypothetical Soviet attack on Western Europe, and the "half-war" forces intended to be the disposable force for meeting any other contingency that emerged, such as supporting South Vietnam had been. The cuts he recommended would have turned the U.S. armed forces into a "one war and modest policing" force too "modest" to wage another Vietnam War.)

Approaching this case critically one may be impressed by how much Fallows says, and what he proposes--his call for sharp force reductions especially striking. Yet the more critically-minded will be struck by what he does not say, does not propose, because of what he implicitly accepts--not least the politically orthodox view of the necessity of a massive, far-beyond-minimal nuclear deterrent and the stationing of massive American conventional forces in Europe, in the name of the Cold War. Fallows' only concern is with the more limited problem of fulfilling this mission he takes as a given, while Fallows gives his more radical suggestions short shrift in the piece. Fallows' call for dramatic force cuts gets a mere half page in his eighteen page article, and indeed he seems to all but bury it in his list of suggested "fixes," as he concentrates on the less contentious and "safer" matter of weapons procurement. Moreover in doing so Fallows presents the sole obstacle to the conventionally unobjectionable demand of making sure the armed forces get the weapons they really need as the prevalence of questionable ideas ("managerialism," "technologism")--of "theories" and "ideology" leading decision-makers astray--as he eschews any sort of structural criticism not only in regard to the prevailing reading of the international situation, but the more domestic matter of the political economy of defense. The economic and political-economic imperatives encouraging defense contractors, like businesses of every other kind, to "sell what they want to sell," and giving them the political influence that enables them to get civilian and military officials to buy it--which mean that not only contestable ideas but also very powerful interests and institutional imperatives stand behind the technologism and the thought of nuclear war Fallows criticizes--does not come up at all in the article.

Fallows' retreat from discussing the fundamental political task to simply ask how the task taken as a given might be done, as he accepts the ends unquestioningly and concentrates on the means instead; if occasionally seeming willing to countenance more than that (like the not-so-modest "modest policing force" proposal), overwhelmingly directs his attention to what he would have us take as "common sense" solutions that tweak rather than overhaul existing structures (as with his suggested "triage" system for weapons acquisition); his suspicion of structured thinking (theories, ideology, etc.) as the obstacle to the more "common sensical" path he advocates, even at that lower level of means; and his disinclination to look at the existence of any material interests behind the prevailing ideas; are collectively highly telling. Rather than the protest movements against war and militarism of the time still evident after the Vietnam War (the opposition to reinstitution of the draft, the nuclear arms race, intervention in Central America), Fallows' case bespeaks the thinking of the political center, with its conservative aversion to radical critique, embrace of the Cold War, and orientation not to solving problems because they are indeed problems but rather to sustaining societal "consensus" behind the status quo, by when discontents over a problem threaten that consensus, attending to the problem (or at least, being seen to do so) to the degree and for the length of time necessary to prevent those discontents from undermining the consensus--in this case, the country's more fundamental military posture.

With these realities in mind it is only fair to say that Fallows' position--and the position of the Movement of which he was representative--can very easily seem a centrist's characteristically "safe" way of appealing to a public in the post-Vietnam period disaffected with America's highly militarized foreign policy for the sake of channeling that disaffection into safe paths in the manner to which centrists conventionally incline (What could be safer than demanding the country equip the troops for their job as well as it can?) as they sought to shore up the flagging "consensus" behind the country's Cold War-era military posture. All of this is underlined by, reflective of the center's "civil" and "pluralistic" aversion to calling out such interests as they display a high tolerance for what others would call "corruption" in high places (blunt reference to which the centrist regards as uncivil, "ethical" politics, "populist" rabble-rousing, "class warfare," etc. at odds with their "pluralistic" politics), Fallows' taking care to avoid raising the matter of "special interests" (i.e. defense contractors) in the situation. And in the combination of the evasions of significant realities with the raising of potentially significant changes--even the "lowest common denominator" matter of the significant alteration of the Pentagon's colossal weapons procurement such, while sharp force cuts intended to head off "another Vietnam" by tying the hands of policymakers are more clearly so--can seem less really serious calls for change than a matter of gesturing at them to give credibility to a speaker who, while not necessarily desiring and possibly even opposed to those changes, believes no one will call their "bluff," the better to achieve that channeling function.

Given such a reading of the Movement one may hypothesize that in the absence of the pressures such as the Vietnam- and post-Vietnam-era protests, and the desire to channel them in a safe direction, the Movement would vanish, with the period of the end of the Cold War affording a convenient test of the hypothesis. After all, the Cold War's conclusion brought a moment in which pressure for significant changes in defense policy could be effective because of the disappearance of the rationale for the Cold War military posture; and in a time of alarm over the budget deficit, deindustrialization and unmet domestic needs greater than they had been a decade earlier, greater pressure to achieve savings in the area of defense spending. Indeed, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn described the situation as producing a state verging on panic over the possibility of "apocalyptic" cuts at the Defense Department in early 1990. However, the Movement's members flinched from publicly considering the implications of the Soviet military's disappearance eliminating the justification for the country's superpower military posture--the "one war and modest policing force" having lost its "one war" and leaving a case for just the "modest policing force" that Fallows had been prepared to float in 1979.** Considering that muted response it is undeniably the case that many of the most immediate concerns of those criticizing the forces were on the wane as the nuclear arms race at least appeared to be coming to an end, and the wars in Central America drawing to a close, a development which could be expected to make the task of channeling dissent into safe paths less urgent. Meanwhile what had been "safe gesturing" in the direction of major reforms some years earlier no longer looked so safe as it was more likely to have real consequences, consequences the generally change-averse centrist did not necessarily desire (the more in as, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Cold War posture was never just about the Soviet Union, but rather a function of a great many domestic and foreign imperatives that did not all vanish with the Berlin Wall's fall, from the requirements of bearing the military burden of maintaining the "open world economy" on the logic of "McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell-Douglas" as Thomas Friedman was to put it later, to "military Keynesianism").

Moreover, all of this converged with how within the political mainstream the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 seemed to, through a brilliant performance by U.S. forces, "debunk" the Movement's criticisms of the Defense Department's practice (all but validating "technologism"); restore the legitimacy of military interventions of the Vietnam type, as the prospect of more of the same provided a rationale for retaining a quasi-Cold War military (invalidating the "modest policing force" vision); and delegitimize dissent against the armed forces and military action in the way epitomized by the slogan "Support the troops"; with the Movement's response to these specific developments, again, revealing.*** Inimical as all this was to its program, had its members been deeply persuaded of and committed to their earlier calls for reform the new "conventional wisdom" was not unanswerable. The triumphalist view of the performance of American weaponry and practice in the Gulf was not invulnerable to challenge, given the extreme weakness of Iraq's opposition to the coalition's assault, with all that meant about the robustness of the "test" of that weaponry and practice that Iraq provided. Moreover, not only with the benefit of hindsight but even at the time one could argue that the 1991 Gulf War contained the seeds of a quagmire that those who took seriously Fallows argument about the dangers of enabling policymakers with a penchant for foreign interventions could easily regard as exactly the reason to limit the country's armed forces to "a modest policing force." However, the MRM's champions refrained from making any such arguments--again, because a Movement designed to channel dissent into a safe path was the less necessary in a context where dissent seemed less urgent, or more cowed, than before--while being associated with a Movement in any way critical of the forces was a political liability in a way it had not been before. (Indeed, where the supposed validation of American "technologism" by the war is concerned one could argue that those less than committed to the Movement's position found less reason than excuse to abandon their old argument.) And indeed, it is notable that the country's next President, a leader of the aforementioned Neo-Liberal wing of the Democratic Party so prominent in the MRM, who on the campaign trail criticized the incumbent administration's vision of post-Cold War defense restructuring as merely inappropriate "Cold War thinking on a smaller scale" while promising more fundamental change yielding greater savings on defense spending, when actually in office, presided over a once-in-a-generation reform that left his predecessor's plan largely intact, and the Cold War force with it, complete with the managerialism, technologism and even the thought of nuclear war Fallows described so many years earlier, in what can be described as "Cold War thinking on a slightly smaller scale."

Putting it bluntly the end of the Cold War, of which the Gulf War was a part, by changing the broader political circumstances (demands for change in the country's military posture) even as the essential problem and its burdens remained (the muscle-bound superpower still muscle-bound, so to speak), called its centrist supporters' bluff (on Capitol Hill, in the press, etc.), and thus revealed the Military Reform Movement as for many of them a ploy that had outlived its usefulness and which the politically canny thus set aside. Underlining this is how those elements of the Movement really committed to any kind of reform like the Fighter Mafia, went on making their case for the reform of weapons procurement, and no longer finding a forum for it in a mainstream "liberal" publication like the Atlantic, made their case in the radical alternative media outlet Counterpunch--because by the twenty-first century the mainstream of the American media had ceased to be willing to platform even its relatively modest questioning of the Pentagon's acquisitions philosophy. Indeed, in spite of not one but a succession of military interventions widely regarded as mistakes and failures from Afghanistan and Iraq forward; far graver concerns over the ability of the U.S. military-industrial base to meet the American armed forces' needs than were ever seen in the era of the MRM now commonplace; and the questions that new types of missiles and drones have raised about the continued viability of weapons platforms like mechanized ground forces reliant on masses of large armored vehicles and large warships American defense planners have long favored as the basis of the country's conventional forces; the inhibitions against such criticism remain intact four decades on. Thus in the 2020s one cannot discern even the beginnings of a show of protest to compare even with the limited and ultimately failed Movement of the post-Vietnam War era, let alone anything at all likely to accomplish what the earlier Movement so signally did not. * The six changes Fallows suggested in his article are, precisely, 1. "Forget about Minuteman survivability—and the MX"; 2. "Concentrate on submarines"; 3. "Get more help from our allies"; 4. "A modest policing force"; 5. "Use the triage system for weapons"; 6. "Train leaders and soldiers for combat, not management." ** Indeed, some of the Movement's supporters had discussed even more radical courses than Fallows, Charles Peters putting the U.S. withdrawing its forces from Europe altogether on the table—in 1982, with the Cold War still on, in his "A Neo-Liberal Manifesto." *** The Cockburns cite a "casual" April 1990 conversation with a "seasoned Pentagon official" who explained that given its then relatively vast tank force and substantial air force, combined with its distance from the U.S., a "threat" from Iraq was one of the few plausible justifications for America's retaining Cold War-level military capabilities in the post-Cold War period ("proving" the need for its mechanized-armored forces, air power, long-range airlift, etc.). and thus "outs" from under the budgetary pressure they were under; that such officials greeted the arrival of the "threat" that summer with relief, dubbing "Operation Desert Shield" "Operation Budget Shield"); and that providing such a justification factored into the Bush administration's determination to resolve the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis militarily. Cockburn et. al.. While the slogan "Support the troops" implied that dissenters had the freedom to protest the government's policy so long as they "supported" the troops, any criticism of the troops' mission was by definition "not supportive," while not incidentally evoking the right-wing myth of "soldier-hating" anti-war protestors in the Vietnam era, making it a roundabout but effective way of silencing dissent. For a critical view of the slogan, and the myth, see Jerry Lembcke's The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam.

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