The question of whether the Clinton administration did or did not seriously attempt to fulfill that promise, and to what result politically and in other ways, would thus seem worthy of attention--attention that the aforementioned neglect means it has not received. In response to the lack of such attention the author of this paper takes up here the question of what Bill Clinton promised and "delivered" in the way of defense policy, starting with a closer look at the relevant content of the too little examined party platform. Afterward the paper addresses the restructuring of the U.S. armed forces that was already well underway before the platform's formulation; Clinton's administration's contributions to that process; and the final results of the process, going by the actual U.S. force posture of 1999, with this extending to the fiscal burden it entailed for the country. Finally the paper discusses what the actual outcome of the process has meant for popular attitudes toward Clinton's Presidency at the time and since.
The Democratic Party Platform of 1992: Defense Policy and Force Structure
The Democratic Party platform document of 1992, "A New Covenant with the American People," relegates "Preserving Our National Security" to the fourth and final part of the document, some seven-tenths of the way into an item foregrounding economic concerns. Then when getting to the matter it devotes much of its space to issues not traditionally identified with "national security" (i.e. state security, particularly against military attack by other states), including as it does trade and the destruction of the natural environment. Still, the material is not without its significance for this paper's area of concern, defense affairs, starting with its setting out the premises about foreign policy to which any defense restructuring is conventionally subordinate. Thus does Part IV begin with the sentence "During the past four years, we have seen the corrosive effect of foreign policies that are rooted in the past, divorced from our values, fearful of change and unable to meet its challenges" as it denounces the Bush administration for insufficient "toughness" ("dictators like Saddam Hussein have been wooed rather than deterred . . . aggression by the Serbian regime . . . has been met by American timidity rather than toughness"); evokes a patriotic, Anti-Communist version of post-World War II history (characterizing America's role in "containing communism . . . building the peace. . . advancing global economic security through new multilateral institutions" as having been moral, effectual and successful); declares that the country has arrived at "another pivotal point in history" to compare with the aftermath of World War II as it chastens those who thought the new era would be a more peaceful one permitting an inward turn ("The collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger or threats to our interests"); and promises to "define a compelling vision for global leadership at the dawn of a new era."
As those who read the last quotation closely are likely to have recognized, rather than actually setting out "a compelling vision for global leadership at the dawn of a new era" the platform merely promises that a Clinton administration would "define" such a "compelling vision" at some unspecified future date. However, the calls for toughness (and deterrence), the pointed invocation of the U.S.' post-World War II and Cold War role, the rhetoric of "global leadership," all convey (as doubtless they were intended to) Clinton's conformity to elite orthodoxy, in this case a "liberal internationalist"-flavored "realism" which identifies American interests as seen from a realpolitik standpoint with upholding and extending the "international liberal order" (aka, just a realism that has noticed such a thing as economics exists). Moreover, if this portion of the text did devote significant attention to "non-traditional" security concerns it was the most traditional aspect of security as military-centered state security that the text covered first. As is typical of such documents it is longer on rhetoric than practical prescriptions, but explicitly embraces the view that the United States "must remain" "the world's strongest military power." At the same time it rejects what it characterizes as "the Bush administration's Cold War thinking on a smaller scale" as "not" "[w]hat the United States needs," calling instead for "a comprehensive restructuring of the American military enterprise to meet the threats that remain." It also promised that its "comprehensive restructuring" would, "without undermining our ability to meet future threats to our security," achieve "substantial savings beyond those promised by the Bush Administration" important for the fiscal and economic agenda the platform set out.
However, the platform is not clear on what this alternative restructuring would entail--and thus how it would differ from the Bush administration's--just as it is not clear on what the standard of being able to meet future threats would be. It is similarly unclear about the level of the "substantial savings" this alternative restructuring is supposed to achieve, whether in itself, or relative to "those promised by the Bush administration." All the reader gets is its identification of "four pillars" for "[a] military structure for the 1990s and beyond," specifying these as "a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat, as we reduce our nuclear arsenals through arms control negotiations and other reciprocal action"; the U.S., as it maintains it commitments to NATO and South Korea, "shift[ing] its "conventional forces . . . toward projecting power wherever our vital national interests are threatened" by "strengthen[ing] our rapid deployment capabilities to deal with new threats to our security posed by renegade dictators, terrorists . . . drug traffickers . . . [and] the local armed conflicts that can threaten the peace of entire regions"; the maintenance of force quality with respect to personnel and technology; and finally "intelligence capabilities redirected to develop far more sophisticated, timely and accurate analyses of the economic and political conditions that can fuel new conflicts." In the platform's emphasis on the nuclear arsenal, commitments to Europe and Northeast Asia and the associated alliance structures, and American preparedness to intervene elsewhere in the world, there would seem to be much more continuity than rupture not just in America's post-Cold War foreign policy but the military means for supporting it. Moreover, save for the premise that "arms control negotiations and other reciprocal action" would enable a reduction of the nuclear arsenal and, implicitly, its associated cost, no statement in the relevant part of the text offers any basis for expectations of savings--as, quite the contrary, the talk of technological investment and the strengthening of "rapid deployment capabilities" would seem to portend not savings, but additional outlays.
Altogether this made for an often vague, contradictory platform, some elements of which, such as force quality or "intelligence capabilities," insusceptible of clear-cut evaluation. However, the more assessable matter of the nuclear and conventional force structure of the U.S. armed forces provides a basis for judging whether Clinton's administration did or did not live up to the promise of more than "Cold War thinking on a smaller scale" by way of a "comprehensive restructuring" of U.S. military forces achieving "substantial savings" as it went about attempting to preserve and strengthen the capabilities it declared as necessities for the fulfillment of its "compelling vision of global leadership," and the author will accordingly focus on that. In doing so it seems only fair to turn to the point of comparison that the party platform itself suggested, the plan the Bush administration had already published.
The Base Force: A Closer Look
The Bush administration plan to which the Democratic party platform of 1992 implicitly referred was the Base Force outlined in the 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States, a product of several years of reconsideration of the U.S. force posture as the Cold War's waning shifted planners' attention away from expectations of conflict with the Soviet Union, and indeed "global" conflict with any actor; and the explosion of the Federal budget deficit from the Reagan administration forward required them to attend to the problem of meeting any particular perceived requirements with reduced resources. Summing up their conception of the post-Cold War situation in its discussion of "National Interests and Objectives in the 1990s" the Strategy declared that the United States would not "retain the forces required for a global conflict," but rather the basis for the reconstitution of such a capability to "forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States," specifically by "deter[ring] such a power from militarizing, and if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability"--hence the term "Base Force." In the meantime American planning would have a more "regional focus" requiring the U.S. to retain forces of sufficient size that, even on a "come-as-you-are" basis the U.S. could, unilaterally if need be, act decisively in a "substantial regional crisis," with this extending to "the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor" (citing, in line with the thinking of the past several years, North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the most obvious possible--indeed, only probable--sources of such aggression) without "leav[ing] us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere." This implied that even as the U.S. employed "overwhelming force" against a regional aggressor it would (at a minimum) still have sufficient disposable forces left over to address a second, simultaneous, "contingency."
To fulfill these requirements the U.S. armed forces would have some 1.6 million active-duty personnel, with 900,000 more in the Ready Reserve. The active-duty force's strategic component would consist in 18 Ohio-class submarines (SSBNs) carrying 432 Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), 550 land-based Minuteman III and Peacekeeper Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and an (unspecified) force of long-range bombers. The active-duty conventional forces would consist in an Army of 12 divisions; a Navy of some 450 ships with 12 battle carriers and 11 tactical air wings; an Air Force with 15 tactical wings; and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (each including a three-brigade division of ground forces and a tactical wing). Meanwhile the reserves would provide at need another 8 Army divisions, 2 Navy and 11 Air Force tactical wings, and another Marine Expeditionary Force.
The result is that the Base Force the Strategy described had a significantly reduced strategic nuclear force, with the American strategic missile force cut in half from its Cold War level, while if it was less clear on this matter, the strategic bomber force apparently smaller still. However, the Base Force vision left overall and active-duty conventional forces at 70-80 percent of their Cold War level. Certainly with 1.6 million active-duty personnel the overall force staffing was 75 percent of the Cold War level, while if the cuts to the various branches were more varied this proportioning remains evident when one looks to the overall number of ground forces divisions and tactical air wings. With a combined 15 active-duty Army and Marine divisions against the Cold War level of 21; and 29 Navy, Air Force and Marine tactical wings as against the Cold War level of 41 such wings; the U.S. retained 71 percent of the late Cold War force level in both divisions and wings. So does this broadly go for the navy, particularly to the extent that one goes by the overall number of ships and carrier groups (its 450 ships and 12 battle carrier groups equaling 81 and 80 percent of the Cold War level, respectively). The pattern also holds in a broad way for the reserves, with the Army reserve falling from 10 divisions to 8, which along with the reserve Marine Expeditionary force worked out to 9 Army and Marine reserve ground forces divisions overall (82 percent of the Cold War level), while the Navy, Air Force and Marines still disposed of 14 reserve tactical wings (100 percent of the Cold War level). It was also clear from the Strategy that U.S. forces would maintain a "forward presence" in their areas of traditional and present commitment, with the Army continuing to station divisions in Germany and Korea (two in the former, one in the latter), and the Air Force wings in Britain, Germany, Korea and Japan, all as the Marines kept their Expeditionary Force in Japan. Accordingly, if the U.S. was downsizing its forces the proportion of the reduced forces it based at these sites would be little changed (between a quarter and a third of the Army's divisions, a rough half of the Air Force tactical wings, and one of the Marines' three Expeditionary Forces, still at their old posts, just as in the late 1980s), translating to consistency in this way as well.
None of this is to deny that there were changes going beyond the trimming of particular force elements. The axe falls on the Army rather than the Marines (the Army losing a third of its active-duty divisions, the Marines none), and if falling on both falls much more heavily on the Air Force than the Navy's aviation (the Air Force losing 40 percent of its tactical wings, the Navy just 15 percent of its own). This can seem to imply a preference for more "rapid deployment"-oriented forces given the combination of downsized forces and greater uncertainty about the world situation--light Marines as against the heavy forces-oriented Army, and more mobile ship-based Navy and (to a lesser extent also ship-based) Marine aviation against land-based Air Force units. Still, in assessing the Marines' treatment one should not forget the 1952 Douglas-Mansfield Act legally mandating the sizing of the force at no less than three divisions and three wings, such that (given the unlikelihood of the law's repeal) other branches would bear far more of any cuts, not least in regard to ground forces, all as what the Army would do in the face of its own reductions is unclear. (For example, would the Army become more rapid deployment-oriented by favoring light units, or have the cuts fall on its eight light divisions as it preserved a higher proportion, or even all, of its ten armored and mechanized divisions to specialize in mechanized warfare as it entirely left rapid-reaction to the Marines as William Odom suggested? The Strategy does not make this clear.) It seems easier to argue that an orientation to rapid deployment was more evident in the case of aviation, but one should not overstate that. Even after taking that larger hit than the Navy, as the Marines escaped any hit at all, the Air Force's share of the armed forces' tactical wings fell only from 61 to 52 percent of the total in the Base Force.
The result is that just as the Democratic party's platform claimed the Base Force--reflecting the memory of the past Cold War and determination to head off the prospect of another in part by showing that the U.S. could and would be able to out-compete any would-be global rival, while commending a downsized Cold War force in sizing, structure, deployment as a foundation for that capacity--was very much a matter of "Cold War thinking on a smaller scale." Still, it seems only fair to acknowledge that even before the change in administrations there was some rethinking of the Base Force concept, with an evaluation of the Base Force plan by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) specifically citing the Federal government's fiscal deficit as a source of pressure on the required spending; pointing out the fact that the Defense Department "does not clearly define the nature of the two regional contingencies" U.S. forces were supposed to be able to handle (even if one assumed the first to be a regional war, just how big was the second crisis supposed to be?); and raising the possibility that the U.S. performance in the 1991 war with Iraq suggested "the use of air assets" could "significantly offset the need for armored forces to counter opposing armor," permitting the U.S. to rely relatively more on air power than on the "heavy ground forces" the Base Force's designers treated as a necessity, calling the latter's retention into question.
Table 1: The Cold War (1989) and Base Forces
|
|
Cold War (1989) Force |
Base Force |
Change (%) |
|
Overall Personnel |
3.19 million |
2.5 million |
-22 |
|
Active-Duty |
2.12 million |
1.6 million |
-25 |
|
Ready Reserve |
1.07 million |
900,000 |
-16 |
|
Strategic Forces |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
SSBNs |
35 |
18 |
-49 |
|
SLBMs |
608 |
432 |
-29 |
|
ICBMs |
1000 |
550 |
-45 |
|
Bombers |
372 |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Army Divisions |
28 |
20 |
-29 |
|
Active-Duty |
18 |
12 |
-33 |
|
Reserve |
10 |
8 |
-25 |
|
Navy Ships |
547 |
450 |
-18 |
|
Carriers |
15 |
12 |
-20 |
|
Attack Submarines |
96 |
79 |
-18 |
|
Navy Tactical Wings |
15 |
13 |
-13 |
|
Active-Duty |
13 |
11 |
-15 |
|
Reserve |
2 |
2 |
0 |
|
Air Force Tactical Wings |
36 |
26 |
-28 |
|
Active-Duty |
25 |
15 |
-40 |
|
Reserve |
11 |
11 |
0 |
|
Marine Expeditionary Forces |
4 |
4 |
0 |
|
Active-Duty |
3 |
3 |
0 |
|
Reserve |
1 |
1 |
0 |
The Clinton administration picked up the restructuring of the forces where the Bush administration left off, with the product the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) that the administration presented to the public in the fall of 1993. In presenting the administration's vision of the international scene the Review document eschews the preceding Strategy's focus on the prospect of a global rival's emergence in favor of a stress on more immediate, concrete problems, outlining four categories of them. Apart from the gesture toward Clinton's "It's the Economy, Stupid" campaign promises of "economic dangers" stemming from America "fail[ing] to build a strong, competitive and growing economy" these were the danger of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; regional dangers "posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers"; and "dangers to democracy and reform," specifically citing the possibility of reversals of liberalization in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." Indeed, in addressing the restructuring of the country's forces to deal with those problems it is only in the discussion of strategic nuclear forces that the Review makes any reference to the U.S. reconstituting a capability in response to "a threatening reversal of events."
Still, the Review document does retain the Strategy's "regional focus" while going much further than the Strategy in clarifying exactly what that consisted in. If the Strategy left the nature of the contingencies that U.S. forces were supposed to be able to meet comparatively vague the Bottom-Up Review set for the U.S. force structure the standard of its "fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously." The Review also cleared up what the terms "major regional conflict," and "nearly simultaneously" both meant. A major regional conflict was a conventional war with an enemy approximating pre-1991 Iraq's paper strength in its mechanized ground forces, and (as Iraq was not) commensurately strong in the air and at sea and in their arsenal of unconventional weaponry, potentially including nuclear weapons, such that one might fairly speak of them as "Iraq-plus," with the document using as its two "illustrative" scenarios of conflict with such a power Iraq or Iran invading Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, and North Korea invading South Korea. The authors anticipated that inflicting a decisive defeat on the aggressor in these contingencies would (to cite just the most discussed conventional forces) require four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine Expeditionary Brigades, ten Air Force tactical wings, and four to five battle carrier groups (equaling some five to seven divisions and fourteen to fifteen wings).* In envisioning the U.S. waging two "nearly simultaneously" major regional conflicts to successful conclusions the Review's premise was that following the outbreak of the first crisis the U.S. would fight that war, have enough forces left over to at least be able to "hold the line" in a second situation of the type should one emerge while the first was ongoing, and then as it made headway in the first war, reallocate the forces no longer required there to help resolve the second crisis in a "win, hold, win" strategy.
The Review justified the commitment to this level of capability on the grounds that it would be best to have policymakers disposing of more force than a single crisis or conflict of this nature was likely to require so as to afford a margin of error lest an opponent prove more formidable than anticipated because of "doctrinal or technological innovation," or unexpected help from allies; and discourage potential aggressors from taking advantage of U.S. preoccupation with one crisis by making a move elsewhere. Still, the Review may not have been the break with the Base Force that it seems at first glance. After all, the anticipation of the U.S. facing on a near-simultaneous basis two "Iraq-plus" opponents together disposing of up to 1.5 million personnel, a nuclear arsenal, and much else in what can seem an exaggeration of at least some of the likely capabilities of the country's more plausible opponents; and setting as its standard for America's force levels adequacy to defeat such an opponent; can appear to be a proxy for the Base Force's foundations for a U.S. military able to reconstitute its global peer-fighting capability--if not a proxy for the actual ability to fight a global peer.
Meanwhile the consistency of the Bottom-Up Review with the preceding Strategy in its conceptualization of the mission of U.S. forces when read this way certainly had its counterpart in a similar consistency in regard to the makeup of U.S. forces. Planning to complete its restructuring of the forces by 1999 (excepting the strategic nuclear forces, the target date for the new structure of which was 2003), active-duty U.S. forces would have some 1.4 million personnel, organized and equipped in broadly the same fashion as before. The strategic force level is nearly identical to what the Base Force posited--18 Ohio submarines with their Trident missiles, 500 Minuteman missiles, and roughly one hundred nuclear bombers the target for 2003--while there was also significant constancy in the sizing of the conventional forces. In considering these it was the case that the Bottom-Up Review called for sharper cuts than the Base Force plan, with the Army's active-duty divisions falling from 12 to 10 and (amid a switch to counting brigades rather than divisions) from eight divisions to five division "equivalents" (on a three brigades-to-a-division basis)." Meanwhile it reduced the Air Force active-duty wings from 15 to 13 and its reserve from 11 to 7, and the Navy's ship numbers from 450 to 346, as it cut even the Marines (in line with the law keeping their three active-duty division-wing Expeditionary Forces, and their one reserve Force as well, but requiring the Marines to maintain the overall organization while being reduced from 195,000 to 174,000 personnel). Still, their ultimate result was the U.S. retaining instead of the 70-80 percent of the active-duty Cold War conventional war-fighting force as the Base Force did some 60-70 percent, certainly going by the forces' overall personnel level (active-duty forces of 1.4 as against 2.1 million persons, some 66 percent of the Cold War level), ground forces divisions (13 as against 21 combined Army and Marine divisions, 62 percent of the Cold War level), and overall tactical wings (26 as against 41 wings, 63 percent of the Cold War level). The same proportioning is broadly evident in the overall reserves, and their numbers of ground forces divisions and tactical air wings, the 1993 Review deciding on a ready reserve of some 800,000 personnel, while keeping 6 ground forces divisions, and 10 reserve tactical wings (working out to 75 percent of then-overall reserve manning, 55 percent of the ground divisions, and 71 percent of the tactical wings). Meanwhile it provided for greater constancy in certain areas (like battle carrier groups, the Review retaining 80 percent of the Cold War level force level with 12 carriers, if making the twelfth ship a training/reserve unit). As may be expected given this quasi-Cold War course the U.S. did not withdraw from Eurasia, but retained considerable forces there, and indeed similar proportions of the Army, Air Force and Marines to what the earlier plan envisaged stationed at those locations, with 3 of the 10 Army divisions at those stations (2 in Germany, 1 in Korea) and 6 of the 13 Air Force tactical wings in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, while, again, the Marine Expeditionary Force stayed in Japan. (Amounting to roughly a third of the divisions and half the tactical wings at their old stations as before, U.S. troop presence in Korea and Japan, in the vicinity of 100,000 personnel, actually remained at nearly its Cold War level in raw numbers.) Again, one might get an impression of a more rapid-reaction-oriented force in the still higher proportion of Marines to Army (instead of 3 of 15 now 3 of 13 active-duty divisions), and Navy and Marines to Air Force in the tactical wings. Nevertheless, any such shift remains ambiguous, the more in as like the aforementioned Strategy the Review does not specify which active-duty divisions the Army would retain, while only slightly revising the distribution of the active-duty tactical wings (the Air Force's share of which fell only from 52 to 48 percent of the total in the schema).
Table 2: The Cold War, Base and Bottom-Up Review Forces
Cold War (1989) Force | Base Force | BUR Force | |
Overall Personnel | 3.19 million | 2.5 million | N/A |
Active-Duty | 2.12 million | 1.6 million | 1.4 million |
Ready Reserve | 1.07 million | 900,000 | N/A |
Strategic Forces | N/A | N/A | N/A |
SSBNs | 35 | 18 | 18 |
SLBMs | 608 | 432 | N/A |
ICBMs | 1000 | 550 | 500 (2003) |
Bombers | 372 | N/A | 114 (2003) |
Army Divisions | 28 | 20 | 15 |
Active-Duty | 18 | 12 | 10 |
Reserve | 10 | 8 | 5 |
Navy Ships | 547 | 450 | 346 |
Carriers | 15 | 12 | 11 |
Attack Submarines | 96 | 79 | 45-55 |
Navy Tactical Wings | 15 | 13 | 12 |
Active-Duty | 13 | 11 | 10 |
Reserve | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Air Force Tactical Wings | 36 | 26 | 20 |
Active-Duty | 25 | 15 | 13 |
Reserve | 11 | 11 | 7 |
Marine Expeditionary Forces | 4 | 4 | 4 |
Active-Duty | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Reserve | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Of course, having established the quasi-Cold War, significantly Base Force-consistent, nature of the Bottom-Up Review's image of the mission, size, structure of the U.S. armed forces there is no denying that the Review failed to clarify a number of far from insignificant matters, such as the size of the tactical submarine and non-carrier surface combatant force--all as the Review's decisions regarding them underwent some refinement and extension not long afterward. This may have been most significantly the case in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which pushed the planning process' time horizon outward by four years (from 1999 to 2003 for the entire forces); and looking further ahead, advocated investments to equip the U.S. to cope with the possible emergence of a "regional great power or global competitor" by the 2010-2015 time frame to be funded by some sacrifice of the Bottom-Up Review-set force level in what can seem at least a step back in the direction of the 1992 Strategy's overt stress on the ability to reconstitute a U.S. ability to deal with a global-level rival (arguably the more easily in that it was never necessarily abandoned).** All of this makes it worth checking the actual forces of the year by which the U.S. force structure was supposed to conform to the prior plan, 1999, for a clearer grasp not just of what the administration delivered, but what it apparently intended to deliver. As a glance at the table below makes clear there were assorted small variations between the Bottom-Up Review plan and the state of the force in 1999--most obviously one more Air Force and one less Navy tactical wing in the reserves. Still, on the whole the figures for the forces in 1999 affirm what the Bottom-Up Review promised with regard to quantitative changes--and arguably qualitative ones. Thus the Clinton administration maintained the U.S. military establishment at 60-70 percent of the Cold War-era force in overall size, ground forces divisions, tactical air wings, with the same going for the apportionment of the ground forces between light and heavy forces, the tactical wings between the Air Force and the Navy/Marines. The reduction of the Army's armored/mechanized divisions from 10 to 6 as the overall Army divisions and combined Army-Marine divisions fell from 18 to 10 and 21 to 13, respectively, meant that the proportion of heavy divisions in the overall ground forces scarcely budged from what it had been in the Cold War era--from 56 to 60 percent of the Army's total divisions, and from 48 to 46 percent of the total Army-Marine divisions. The shift in the balance between Air Force and Navy/Marine aviation was greater, but rather than a reorientation to ship-based aviation for superior mobility for rapid-reaction purposes this reflected the Marines' immunity to cuts, and, as the Navy's perceived mission shifted from contestation of the seas with a near-peer to the projection of force into coastal waters and inland from them ("littoral warfare"), the continued commitment to a surface fleet centered on battle carrier groups and the needs of the Marine Corps. Accordingly even as the restructuring cut the force of cruisers, destroyers and frigates relatively sharply (from a 1989 level of 211 to 116, retaining just 55 percent of the level of those forces), it held on to a relatively high proportion of its carriers and assault ships (of its 15 carriers and 13 assault ships in 1989, retaining 11 of each, 73 and 85 percent of the 1989 force levels). Likewise the "forward present" forces were, in their proportion of the armed forces' totals and their particular overseas stations, consistent with the vision of 1993, and in turn the Cold War arrangement that the 1993 vision broadly carried forward (with three U.S. Army divisions in Germany and Korea, six Air Force wings in Western Europe and East Asia, and a Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan).
Table 3: The Cold War, Base, Bottom-Up Review and Post-Bottom-Up Review Forces**
|
|
Cold War (1989) Force |
Base Force |
BUR Force |
Post-BUR (1999) Force |
|
Overall Personnel |
3.19 million |
2.5 million |
N/A |
2.18 million |
|
Active-Duty |
2.12 million |
1.6 million |
1.4 million |
1.37 million |
|
Ready Reserve |
1.07 million |
900,000 |
N/A |
806,000 |
|
Strategic Forces |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
SSBNs |
35 |
18 |
18 |
18 |
|
SLBMs |
608 |
432 |
N/A |
432 |
|
ICBMs |
1000 |
550 |
500 (2003) |
550 |
|
Bombers |
372 |
N/A |
114 (2003) |
c. 87 |
|
Army Divisions |
28 |
20 |
15 |
15 |
|
Active-Duty |
18 |
12 |
10 |
10 |
|
Reserve |
10 |
8 |
5 |
(5) |
|
Navy Ships |
547 |
450 |
346 |
c. 300 |
|
Carriers |
15 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
|
Attack Submarines |
96 |
79 |
45-55 |
57 |
|
Navy Tactical Wings |
15 |
13 |
12 |
11 |
|
Active-Duty |
13 |
11 |
10 |
10 |
|
Reserve |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
Air Force Tactical Wings |
36 |
26 |
20 |
20 |
|
Active-Duty |
25 |
15 |
13 |
12 |
|
Reserve |
11 |
11 |
7 |
8 |
|
Marine Expeditionary Forces |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
|
Active-Duty |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
|
Reserve |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
Table 4: The Cold War (1989) and Post-BUR (1999) Active-Duty Forces
|
|
Cold War (1989) Force |
Post-BUR (1999) Force |
Change (%) |
|
Overall Personnel |
2.12 million |
1.37 million |
-35 |
|
Strategic Forces |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
SSBNs |
35 |
18 |
-49 |
|
SLBMs |
608 |
432 |
-29 |
|
ICBMs |
1000 |
550 |
-45 |
|
Bombers |
372 |
87 |
-77 |
|
Army Divisions |
18 |
10 |
-44 |
|
Heavy Divisions |
11 |
6 |
-45 |
|
Light Divisions |
7 |
4 |
-43 |
|
Major Naval Combatants |
322 |
186 |
-42 |
|
Carriers |
15 |
11 |
-27 |
|
Other Major Surface Combatants |
211 |
118 |
-44 |
|
Attack Submarines |
96 |
57 |
-41 |
|
Navy Assault Ships |
13 |
11 |
-15 |
|
Navy Tactical Wings |
13 |
10 |
-23 |
|
Air Force Tactical Wings |
25 |
12 |
-52 |
|
Marine Expeditionary Forces |
3 |
3 |
0 |
Table 5: U.S. Army Divisions and Air Force Wings in Western Europe and East Asia, Unit Numbers and Percentages of Total Available
|
|
Cold War (1989) |
Base Force |
Post-BUR (1999) Force |
|
Army Divisions |
5 |
4 |
3 |
|
% Total Divisions |
28 |
33 |
30 |
|
Air Force Tactical Wings |
14 |
6-8 |
6 |
|
% Total Tactical Wings |
56 |
40-53 |
46 |
In light of the foregoing it does not seem unreasonable to consider Clinton as having, in the foreign-defense policy sphere as in the domestic-economic sphere, once again disappointed and even betrayed those supporters who hoped for change from his administration--the public never really getting that promised peace dividend, as those attentive to the Clinton administration's failure to make good on its promises of action to redress the country's industrial and social woes are well aware. Indeed, all of this can seem evidentiated by the actually rather limited nature of the criticism to which the Clinton administration was subject from the right by critics of the spending cuts it really did institute. For all their sound and fury, Clinton's neoconservative detractors (certainly if one goes by the Project for a New American Century's soon-to-be-notorious Rebuilding America's Defenses study) broadly approved the Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review's two major regional war standard. They also approved the latter's attention to the possible emergence of an opponent more powerful than an Iraq, Iran or North Korea in the early part of the coming century and case for devoting resources to that contingency. Their objection was simply that the existing force was somewhat undersized for its nearer-term mission (questioning whether the Bottom-Up Review force was really enough for even a "win, hold, win" approach to two simultaneous major regional conflicts); and that that "inadequate" force was underfunded relative to its size, organization, deployment and necessary standards as they proposed as their preferred alternative not much more than what the largely neoconservative-manned Bush administration had earlier advocated in the Base Force (70-80 percent rather than 60-70 percent of the Cold War force level), and something in the range of a spending increase equaling 0.6-0.9 percent of GDP to cover the cost. (One may add that they thought some of the specifics of the country's military posture, like the distribution of the forces overseas, "too Cold War-minded," though this was much more a matter of their desiring that U.S. forces acquire new and additional foreign stations at locations they thought newly relevant rather than calling on American forces to evacuate any of their old ones--specifically calling for a greater focus on the Pacific and especially Southeast Asia, as in Europe they advocated a greater tilt toward the Balkans/Black Sea region.)
Nevertheless, it seems fair to acknowledge that there was relatively little acknowledgment of any feeling of disappointment in Clinton's breaking of his promises, especially with regard to their shortchanging his fiscal and domestic policy, in the media, scholarship, politics or anywhere else. In considering this it seems relevant that Clinton's campaign promises in the area of foreign and defense policy were not only less prominent than his economic promises during the campaign, but more difficult for observers to assess, lay observers especially. (Clinton's promising a health care program that would "cover everyone" was a promise of a dramatic change that people could very easily judge as either having happened or not happened on the basis of the everyday experience of their lives. By contrast understanding the actualities of the forces' restructuring in a way nuanced enough to really judge the issue meant deliberate, careful and informed attention to material not easily accessible to the general public.) Indeed, it seems possible, even probable, that the public thought the government had cut defense spending more deeply than it did given the discussion's stress not on longer-run Cold War budgetary norms but the exceptionally high spending levels of the Reagan era; the vast platform the media gave to the right's protests that cuts to the forces and the defense budget had gone too far, with the essential claim making more impression than any specifics; and the media's heavy, and highly sympathetic, attention to those fearing or suffering economic pain due to the closure of bases and defense plants giving an impression that government cutbacks in this area were going to be or had been much more profound than they really were, with one RAND Corporation study using the word "apocalyptic" (this perhaps not unintentionally, with an eagerness to play up such pain plausibly an indirect attack on the cuts themselves rather than humane concern for the welfare of those affected).
Meanwhile, as the battle raged over the defense budget so did another, courtesy of the culture war. The combination of post-Gulf War demands by feminists that American combat units admit women; the scandal surrounding sexual and other misconduct by U.S. naval aviators at their association's 1991 Las Vegas convention; and Clinton's campaign promise to end Defense Department discrimination against gays and lesbians; converged with the Republicans' cultivation during and after the election of an image of Clinton as a countercultural "draft-dodger" and possibly even traitorous anti-war protestor unfit to be "commander in chief" and deservedly hated by those serving honorably to produce a firestorm over the matter of the gender politics of the forces, as the right ferociously denounced "politically correct" civilians imposing their standards on what they saw as a military culture that could not and should not be made so. (Indeed, it is telling that Patrick Buchanan's famed "culture war" speech ranked opposition to putting women into ground combat units right alongside opposition to abortion rights and gay and lesbian rights as an implicitly equal priority for the right.)
Relatively easy to understand and highly emotive, this furor absorbed enormous attention in the media and among the wider public that might otherwise have gone to such considerations as the post-Cold War mission, budgeting, sizing, structuring and equipment of the U.S. armed forces. It is also not irrelevant that for all the nerves that it touches and the rancor that it raises the matter of gender in the armed forces was in all the important ways a "safer" subject than the more material issues with their far higher stakes from the standpoint of the summits of international politics and industry--and the way in which the terms of debate may have made them less easily deflected than more conventional criticisms of the armed forces. In fact one may very easily imagine that policymakers fearful of civilian pressure for deeper force cuts welcomed the public's preoccupation with gender politics as they pursued the unpopular foreign policy, fiscal and defense course of dispensing with the peace dividend as they made a quasi-Cold War posture, and its heavy costs to the public, a permanent fact of American life. Indeed, given Clinton's campaign's raising the issue of "gays in the military" when it did, in the manner it did; the attention the news media lavished upon policies toward gender relative to the more material concerns; the fury with which policymakers largely in agreement about the more material concerns discussed here fought this matter out before the cameras; and then, after compromises which left a great many unsatisfied--like the exclusion of women from ground combat units, and the decision to permit gays and lesbians to serve in the armed forces on the terms of "Don't ask, don't tell"; policymakers anxious to minimize cuts may have more than merely "welcomed" the preoccupation, with even the manner in which the argument waned suggestive. The matter of "gender integration" of the forces fell by the wayside after the restructuring was settled, and the arguments over it never again acquired the same heat. Indeed, it seems suggestive of the part that cynical exploitation of the issue, or even its manufacture, played in the discourse at the time that the next Democratic administration (Barack Obama's) realized the fullest demands for the integration of the armed forces with the admission of women into ground combat units and the end of "Don't ask, don't tell" without anything like the prior level of controversy, very likely because at that later date no one saw it as politically useful to make the issue another front in the culture war.
Meanwhile, as the controversy over gender cooled off one of the foremost facts of American economic life was the emergence of a massive financial bubble in "dotcom" stocks. A convergence between hype about a new technology and the susceptibility of highly financialized economies to speculative mania seen again and again since at least the Victorian railroad bubbles, the makers of the conventional wisdom insisted that what was going on was the birth of a "New Economy," and that indeed the signs of economic decline over which there had been so much argument a short time earlier were merely its birth pangs. Intellectually dubious as this position was at the time the country did enjoy relatively rapid economic growth that contributed significantly to the fall of the Federal government-to-GDP ratio and the contraction of the budget deficit (however hollow or unsustainable that growth and the improvement of the country's fiscal situation may have been, a miracle to many observers at the time). As a result the urgency of the economic and fiscal concern to which Clinton's platform had spoken during the presidential campaign faded, with any questioning that these were the best years of our lives" drowned out by elite mouthpieces' hosannas over the epochal economic revolution supposedly at hand--diminishing the urgency that had earlier surrounded specifically fiscal concern about defense spending, and angst about a peace dividend.
Of course, since the bubble burst it has only grown clearer from year to year that that economic revolution the singers of the New Economy already treated as an accomplished fact never actually materialized. However, the hosannas, the self-satisfaction, the complacency that the illusion encouraged all long outlasted the late '90s mania, leaving the officially promulgated illusions about "the Clinton era" enduring virtually unchallenged as the conventional wisdom of the mainstream long after that moment (such that even a Paul Krugman could describe America's policy elite as mentally "stuck in some sort of time warp, in which it's always 1997"). Thus did Bill Clinton's own wife Hillary, when running for the presidency herself in 2016, evoke the memory of those supposed "good times"--and then to her and her supporters' shock, find herself on the receiving end of defeat by a candidate who remembered the principle that "It's the Economy, Stupid" as he campaigned on appeals to widespread discontent with the same line of economic policy against which her husband had campaigned back in 1992, before making his party so unhappily identifiable with it among the American electorate.
* In its assumption of an enemy with forces of 400,000-750,000 under arms and a highly mechanized army with 2,000-4,000 tanks, 4,000-5,000 other armored fighting vehicles, and 1,000-3,000 artillery pieces the outline of the Major Regional Conflict adversary broadly approximated Iraq and North Korea (and in terms of personnel at least, Iran). However, it also assumed an enemy with 500-1,000 combat aircraft, a coastal navy of 100-200 craft mainly consisting of missile-armed surface vessels but including up to 50 conventionally-powered submarines, and 100-1,000 "Scud-class" ballistic missiles, "some possibly with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads," air, sea and missile forces all far greater than what any of those states, or any other states comparable to them, possessed at the time or seemed very likely to acquire in the near term. Even the strongest of the three countries in the air, North Korea, had no more than 650 combat aircraft, while if its navy possessed some four hundred combatants, the number of missile-armed craft came to perhaps thirty, the number of submarines to two dozen or less during this period. Moreover because the combination of Western economic sanctions and the loss of Soviet support the three states were hard-pressed to sustain their existing air, sea (or even land) force levels, never mind expand them to what the Review envisaged (all as, of course, wartime losses had already greatly reduced Iraq's forces from what they had been before the 1991 war, when the country more closely resembled the hypothetical "MRC"-type adversary). And of course, in 1993 none of those states had any nuclear weapons, let alone deliverable warheads. The estimate of five to seven divisions is premised on the Marine divisions each having three brigades.
** The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review document reaffirmed the broad outline of U.S. foreign policy as explained in the preceding documents, including in its summation of "Key Tenets of U.S. National Security Strategy" the Base Force concept object of preserving the emergence of a global rival, though more explicitly incorporating preparation for such a challenge in the fundamentals of its force planning as it considered three possible "paths." The first concentrated on near-term threats of the Major Regional Contingency/Conflict type for which the authors held the Bottom-Up Review's force structure to be necessary (eschewing immediate attention to the longer-term danger on the premise that the U.S. would have ample time to adjust course before any larger threat than that emerged), the second a focus on preparation for the long-term eventuality of the aforementioned regional great power or global competitor, the third the combination of the two with specific recommendations for budgeting in regard to each (specifically force cuts that would allow for greater long-term investment), and pointedly recommended the third option. Following it entailed a reduction of U.S. force staffing below the BUR's 1.4 million (the target was now 1.36 million), but this was a relatively minor change next to those previously discussed, with in many cases the consistency with the BUR force structure virtually perfect (and this, again, out to 2003), among them an Army with 10 active-duty divisions and the equivalent of five reserve divisions in fifteen National Guard brigades; a Navy with 12 aircraft carriers, and 1 of them in reserve, 11 carrier wings with 1 in reserve, and an attack submarine force in the 45-55 range (setting a target of 50 submarines, as against the 73 the Navy still operated at the time); and 3 active-duty Marine Expeditionary Forces. At the same time it cleared up matters about which the BUR document had been silent, like the size of the Ready Reserve (to be some 835,000 personnel), while declaring a commitment to 12 amphibious ready groups as well as to 12 carriers, and 116 additional major surface combatants (these the force of cruisers, destroyers, frigates at the Navy's disposal). It also slightly revised the plan for the Air Force's tactical wings, sticking with the target of 20 wings, but transferring one of the active-duty wings to reserve status (so that instead of 13 and 7 the makeup of the 20 wings was 12 active-duty and 8 reserve wings, respectively).
*** The author arrived at the estimate of 87 bombers by excluding the B-1 bombers withdrawn from the strategic role, even as they remained part of the long-range bomber force (which then numbered 178 aircraft in all). The author based the estimate of a Navy "Battle Force" of some 300 ships in 1999 on the adjustment of the U.S. Navy's Naval History and Heritage Command's data for the apparently more conservative count used in the previously cited government documents. (Where the GAO report on the Base Force gives the 1989 figure as 547 ships--as seen in the tables--the History and Heritage Command's Ship Force Levels report 592 U.S. Navy ships as the size of the force that same year.)

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