Wednesday, November 18, 2026

The Culture War: Four Propositons

In the interest of Internet user-friendliness, a handy list. The propositions read as follows:

1. The Culture War was an Elite Project From the Start.
By this I do not mean that the sociocultural conflicts the culture war addresses were wholly manufactured. However, I do think it safe to say that the political right's leaders
1. Deliberately exacerbated the grievances of the public over issues like the Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade decision (actually uncontroversial at the time), in part by linking specific grievances to the politics of status and identity in a manner already old in the late twentieth century. 2. Combined the differing issues they deliberately inflamed opinion over (abortion, gay rights, etc.) into a larger conflict between "traditionalists" and "secularist-progressives" that they imbued with a significance more than the sum of its parts, converting disparate arguments into a culture war, and 3. Foregrounded the culture war as the central issue of the time with an eye to diverting attention from economic concerns on which the right was unwilling and unable to make concessions to public discontents, with this tying together, foregrounding, elevation of the issue again redounding to the intensity of feeling.
Pat Buchanan's famous "Culture War" speech of 1992 is exemplary of such usage of the relevant sentiment in its combination of disparate issues (abortion, gay rights, public funding of religious schools, censorship of pornography, the admission of women into Army combat units) into a single larger fight, a "cultural war" that was "about who we are . . . what we believe . . . what we stand for," "as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself," making "this election . . . about more than who gets what."

2. The Culture War was Inherently Extremist.
Our commentators and politicians bandy terms like "extremist" irresponsibly, and often cynically, but the term has long had an intelligible meaning within the post-World War II American political discourse. It denoted someone who could not be accommodated within the conception of "legitimate discourse" propounded by those we think of as "in the center"--which insists that political debate be interest-based and pluralistic, pragmatic and civil, and consensus-minded so as to keep down the temperature of controversy, and avert the dangers of division, radicalization, and the conflicts that can come from it through everyone regarding themselves as just one interest among many, and those interests respecting each other as all essentially legitimate negotiating their concerns one at a time as the respect "unity" and "consensus" as paramount. American politics, of course, rarely came close to this Platonic ideal, but there is no denying that the culture war was blatantly at odds with it. Rather than a politics of interest which treated other actors as legitimate, it was a politics of values which regarded those who disagreed with it as illegitimate. Rather than pragmatically, civilly negotiating it was central to the culture war that its proponents tied different concerns together and made them part of a larger struggle they themselves declared to be a war (some civility, this)--all as there is no question that the culture war was not just brazenly divisive, but often deliberately so, as they cast unity and consensus to the winds.

3. In Spite of its Extremism the Center Accommodated and Indeed Colluded in the Culture War.
Given that the culture war was so obviously outside the bounds of legitimate discourse as the center understood it it is only natural to wonder why the center eschewed treating it as such--why instead of taking the hard line against it that it has, for example, the demands of the left, it accommodated itself to culture being shifted to the center of politics in exactly the way the culture warriors wanted. Its doing so reflects two aspects of the center's conduct, then and later, namely 1. The center's highly touted opposition to extremism (for which the term "horseshoe theory" is shorthand), reflecting the reality of the center's deep conservatism, was in the main fierce opposition to the left, as it gave extremism on the right a pass, and 2. The center, like the right, decreasingly willing or able to address popular economic discontents given its embrace of neoliberal/neoconservative economic and social policy, saw shifting the focus of political disputation from the economy to culture, from class to cultural divisions (and the associated politics of status and identity) as also advantageous for it. Thus did the politicians of the center, rather than refusing to have any truck with the culture warriors, reach across the proverbial aisle to them while admonishing those who objected--all as a generally centrist media, consistent with its modus operandi regarding the far right as Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon described it, "normalized" the culture war as it deflected attention from the extent to which it was an elite project, trivialized or euphemized its objects (the extent to which reaction or bigotry may have been involved), and even amplified its demands. (Thus would one never have realized the extent to which the controversy over abortion was made rather than spontaneous--all as they would imagine from the coverage a country evenly split over the matter, or even one in which a Not-So-Silent Majority opposed Roe vs. Wade, rather than the reality of consistent, often significant, majority support for abortion rights down to the present polling has indicated--all as they popularized the vision of an America divided not between rich and poor, but "Red" and "Blue.")

4. While the Culture War Never Achieved its Deeper Purpose, it Has Nonetheless Done Much for its Initiators.
Those on the right who launched the culture war, and those in the center who enabled them for their own purposes (and their essentially common purposes as conservatives/neoliberals/neoconservatives unwilling to address popular discontents with the economy and more broadly devoted to the status quo), never quite succeeded in making the public forget the economy and concentrate on culture. Quite the contrary, the mantra that "It's the Economy, Stupid," validated when Buchanan's Republicans lost the 1992 election, has remained valid ever since, not a single election turning on the culture war, and indeed attempts to make elections about it ending badly for those making the attempt. (Thus did the Republican Party, exploiting the culture war in the form of their attempted impeachment of Bill Clinton, find their ambitions thwarted in the midterm election of 1998. And thus did a Democratic party running on a neoliberal economic platform against a Republican party increasingly identifying itself with economic nationalism lose in 2016, and 2024.) Still, there is no question that in the efforts to foreground culture and divisions over it they did succeed in diverting attention from, indeed blocking attention to, economic and socioeconomic concerns, at the expense of those desiring change and to the benefit of those resisting it. In doing so they made life harder for the left in particular--because in the mainstream mind it was now identified with identity politics instead of class politics, which meant that it suffered the opprobrium of those who, even if potentially open to its appeal on class and economic grounds, despise the politics of identity (little knowing that the left actually opposes them!), all as leftists had to devote much of what time and energy and resources they had to trying to correct the misapprehension (and from what I can tell of the conventional wisdom, generally failing). By contrast, given the continued determination of the Democratic Party to refuse to address popular economic grievance, or even to fight the culture war as seriously as their opponents do (choosing "civility" even as their rivals do not), the right, if far from getting all it wanted, has been the great beneficiary in the situation--as shown not only in its electoral strength, but its setting of the policy agenda, and shifting politics ever rightward after itself as dissent toward the status quo gets channeled either into still more identity politics (rather than an Occupy Wall Street or an anti-war movement, Black Lives Matter, until in 2020 it proved to have outlived its usefulness), or the right (as seen in the Tea Party and what it helped to pave the way for, Make America Great Again). All of this has made American politics at the 250th anniversary of the country's birth a very, very different thing from what they had been, in their actualities and seeming potentials, from what they had been at the 200th, way back in 1976--not that the thoroughly presentist commentariat occupying the mainstream platforms (and insuring others of different views are kept off of them) would ever suggest such a thing. After all, using history to understand the present is not what the so-called pundits do, all as in spite of the fact that many of them were alive back then 1976 A.D. may as well be 1976 B.C. from the standpoint of their frames of reference.

No comments:

Subscribe Now: Feed Icon