Wednesday, November 18, 2026

What Will Avengers: Doomsday Make at the Box Office?

Originally Published on Raritania October 8, 2026

UPDATE (November 19, 2026): Working through the inflation-adjusted range and average of the prior four Avengers films' grosses, and what the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU)'s films have tended to make relative to their immediate predecessors in their series' in real terms (grosses falling 20-50 percent relative to them), it seemed to me that the most probable final worldwide take for the upcoming Avengers: Doomsday on the basis of those numbers was in the range of $1.3 to $2.2 billion. However, I also stressed the factors that made it seem plausible the film would fall short of even that very high figure I gave as the low end of the range, not least the uncertainty about a Chinese market very important to the Avengers' really massive success in 2018-2019, and which has been less reliable for American releases, MCU releases included.

However, the tracking estimates suggest something different. A projection out in August, but which has got more attention since, has Avengers: Doomsday enjoying a debut of $400 million domestically and $1 billion worldwide (beating the prior Avengers: Endgame in current dollar terms, and this year's Spider-Man too!). Impressive in itself, simply (on the basis of how things went with the prior four Avengers films) going by the multipliers of 2.4 to 3 of the opening weekend to get the full domestic run, and 2.4 to 3.25 times the domestic gross to get the full global take, we end up with an estimated domestic gross in the range of $900 million-$1.2 billion, and $2.3 to $3.9 billion dollars globally. (The result is that this could easily be the first release to break the $1 billion barrier in North America, and perhaps also the first to break the $3 billion barrier globally, with even the $4 billion barrier not wholly out of the question--in current-dollar terms, of course, but then as we all know very few box analysts acknowledge such a thing as inflation, and even were they to do so, it still makes a good sound bite and is by any measure a truly remarkable box office performance for any movie, let alone the fifth installment in a heavily-mined and long-dormant franchise.)

At the high end especially this is very respectable indeed by even Phase Three standards (beating Endgame's inflation-adjusted $3.7 billion)--and even at the low end suggests that in raising the matter of the caveats to my calculations I should also have been thinking of reasons why the movie might shoot above the mark suggested by the averages rather than just below it, an oversight I suppose was due to thinking of it as "just another Marvel" movie--a mistake I previously made in my earliest guesses about Deadpool & Wolverine. But how seriously ought we to take the projection? After all, it is a relatively early estimate, and it may be getting attention because it is sensationally high, rather than because it is necessarily well-grounded, with this mattering the more when the media is, as it has so often been in regard to the MCU, operating in claqueur mode. Still, the analysts regarded the response to Avengers: Endgame Encore as robust, and so are the presales for Doomsday. (Thus did Forbes' Paul Tassi quip that Avengers: Doomsday a month and a half before release had already overtaken the gross of this summer's flop Supergirl domestically.) And even if the film ends up falling short of the most optimistic estimate of the moment, it can still do so by a considerable way while leaving its backers very satisfied indeed. That may not quite "bring Marvel back"--but if is anything like what these figures suggest it will at least mean that like Spider-Man the Avengers remain very salable indeed, and that what in 2024 looked to the more skeptical (myself included) like not just wring-every-penny-out-of-the-franchise cynicism in which the witless Bob Iger and company have been second to none but desperation will have paid off very well indeed. Still, even allowing for that those interested in more than just the bullish perspective would do well to remember that when Episode VII hit theaters in 2015 it looked like Lucasfilm had been a very good buy for Disney, the future of the Star Wars saga very bright indeed. Two-and-a-half years later (after The Last Jedi, after Solo) attitudes were very different, and the outlook has not really got much brighter since (even as Disney keeps plugging away, and once more bets big on Shawn Levy's ability to make fans happy). And so one may reasonably reserve their final judgment not only until we see how Doomsday actually plays with the public, but whether Secret Wars (due in December 2027) ends up an Endgame-like triumph, or an Episode IX-like fizzle.

ORIGINAL (October 8, 2026): As those who have seen me play the game of "How much will this movie make?" before know, I prefer a quantitative approach based on the principal information actually made available to the public in a consistent, timely, systematic way--box office grosses. Thus I look at how the predecessors of a movie in a franchise (it is franchise films that lend themselves to this approach) did before, adjust the figures for inflation, look for any patterns I can find (the range of the grosses, the averages, the trends from film to film, etc.), and then turn to any factors that may skew the result--drawing analogy with how similar films did, for instance--while offering any necessary qualifiers. Thus did I calculate that if Indiana Jones 5 performed "like an Indiana Jones film" it could be expected to make a billion dollars, with a quarter of a billion dollar margin either way (with the caveat that given the downward trend the film seemed more likely to undershoot than overshoot the billion-dollar mark), while the possibility existed that, by way of analogy with Star Wars, it could play like Solo instead and crater--which is, of course, exactly what happened.

Thus when considering the prospects of the upcoming Avengers: Doomsday I started with the four Avengers movies made to date grossed between $1.4 and $2.8 billion in current dollars, or about $2 billion and $3.7 billion in today's (August 2026) terms, while averaging some $2.6 to $2.7 billion in today's dollars. If we go by my rule of thumb that cutting out those films that did very poorly or exceptionally well (cutting out Captain Marvel and cutting out Spider-Man, cutting out The Thunderbolts and cutting out Deadpool) "normal" Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) films make just 50-80 percent of what their predecessors did before the pandemic, with the biggest tending to take the largest hit, we end up with a range of $1 billion to $3 billion, and a modified average of $1.3 to $2.2 billion. The result is that going by the numbers I have here one may reasonably expect the movie to make not less than a billion dollars, with considerably greater possible and twice that much within the bounds of reasonable expectation (if less likely than the low end of the range).

However, just as with Indiana Jones the qualifiers are really significant, because even allowing for the shock to the box office of the pandemic the latest Avengers will not have the advantages of its predecessors. It does not have the benefit of the kind of build-up that made the original 2012 The Avengers such a hit, and still less the far greater build-up that made the 2018 and 2019 Avengers: Infinity War and Avengers: Endgame even bigger successes. Instead the best the movie will have going for it is the good will that this summer's Spider-Man has brought the franchise--though this may not count for very much in a period in which, in contrast with Phase Three's success in making the Marvel Cinematic Universe more than the sum of its parts, today the Universe is really just a collection of franchises of wildly varying popularity and appeal, all as much of the public may feel that they have already "seen their one superhero movie for this year." And especially as we are talking about the global gross one also ought not forget just how much China mattered in Endgame's mighty final take, that market alone contributing a mighty $632 million to the total ($827 million after adjustment for inflation), and just under $1 billion for Infinity War and Endgame together (some $1.3 billion in today's terms)--and that even if Hollywood is still capable of making big money in China (just look at how Zootopia 2 performed), China has not been anywhere near so reliable a field for Hollywood's films as it was in the '10s. (Deadpool & Wolverine, such a colossus in America, made just $60 million in China, while Spider-Man, if doing better, was still a long way from the event it was in America, or how the Avengers movies did in China back in 2018-2019, taking in just $232 million, and this about as good as it gets ordinarily, even $100 million a feat for an American movie in China these days.)

The result is that, speaking broadly, I expect that thinking in terms of its predecessors the movie is much less an Endgame box office prospects-wise than an Ultron, if that, for if a gross of a billion dollars or more is hardly inconceivable, it is also far from assured. (After all, if a billion dollars is not what it was before, you still have to sell a lot of tickets to bank that much.) And given what the last two Avengers films cost, and what this one project is already reported as costing (which British tax documents may, as has happened before with Marvel's productions and with Disney's productions more generally, prove a significant underestimate), even a billion dollar-plus gross may prove to be not just a disappointment for the studio, but actually put Disney-Marvel in danger of ending up in the red on this film, all while being worrisome indeed from the standpoint of the whole franchise. After all, there is much more than just the gamble on this one movie at stake, with Avengers 5 to be followed by Avengers 6 in the form of Avengers: Secret Wars, all as the franchise-runners are all too clearly looking to the two films to bring back the MCU's Phase Three glory days, with all that means for the bar the movie really needs to clear to be regarded by one and all as the unqualified, franchise viability-restoring success that its backers want it to be, and others to see it as. Indeed, given all that is riding on this one it seems to me that, however the film turns out, Christopher Nolan's New Hollywood-ish gamble on The Odyssey apart, Avengers: Doomsday seems to me the most interesting single film of the year from an "armchair movie executive" box office-watching standpoint.

Revisiting James Fallows' "Muscle-Bound Superpower"

The Military Reform Movement was a post-Vietnam War grouping of servicepersons, civilian defense officials, non-governmental experts, sympathetic politicians and their allies in the media which, significantly in response to the perceived failures of the U.S. armed forces' approach to the conflict in Southeast Asia, challenged the military-industrial "Establishment"'s practices. Bringing together elements from the Pentagon Fighter Mafia," to the Neo-Liberals of the Democratic Party and the bipartisan Congressional Military Reform Caucus, to journalists like James Fallows, it was prominent in the late 1970s and 1980s, but faded away quickly afterward, after having enjoyed little practical influence on the relevant decisions even in the peak years of its visibility and very little to show for itself in the way of a legacy afterward (some input into the design of particular fighter aircraft, the "cult" of Air Force officer John Boyd, etc.), with this having its reflection in the slightness of the attention to it since. However, even if the Movement's results were slight given its relevance to the history of the American discourse about national security, its connections with numerous important tendencies within American political history more broadly (e.g. Democratic Party Neo-Liberalism), and the general understanding of institutional responses to military defeat and pressures for change in its wake; the lack of discussion of the Movement would seem a problematic gap in the scholarly literature. As a contribution to redressing that gap the author presents here an examination of James Fallows' October 1979 article in The Atlantic magazine, "Muscle-Bound Superpower: The State of America's Defense," which introduced the movement to the public, as significantly representative of the Movement's range of policy concern, suggested courses of action, and intellectual premises, with an eye to what they meant for its ultimate results.

In taking on the matter of what Fallows described as "the muscle-bound superpower," and the practices that made it so, Fallows foregrounded the question of whether America was getting "good value for the money" it spent on defense--and answered the question in the negative. His explanation for that unhappy state of affairs was the influence of three policymakers whose genuine insights, reasonable objectives and sensible aspirations calcified into a hegemony of flawed ideas within the making of defense policy. These were, namely, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his promotion of private sector-style efficiency-minded "managerialism" within defense policymaking commonly accused of being remote from battlefield realities; "father of the nuclear navy" Admiral Hyman Rickover, who had championed a "technologism" that seized upon the fullest exploitation of technical possibility without regard for other factors, leading to programs delivering smaller and smaller numbers of increasingly costly, complex and unreliable systems at the expense of every other military need; and longtime, many-hatted Washington "insider" Paul Nitze, who promoted a "Strangelovian" pursuit of the chimera of "winnable" nuclear war--in Fallows' phrase "the thought of" unthinkable "nuclear war," with all its own incentive to pursuing dubious technological possibility, ever-larger and more variegated forces, etc. in pursuit of an impossible goal at a very high cost.

Against managerialism, Fallows offered a return to training officers "for combat, not management"; against technologism a "triage system for weapons" dispensing with what was not actually likely to be useful in either the "low-grade" threat scenarios in which the U.S. confronted limited opponents, or the "big war" scenario of a clash with the Soviets (in which category Fallows classed, for example, the Navy's AEGIS radar-equipped warships); and against the thought of nuclear war an end to preoccupation with the more extreme "hypotheticals" of "nuclear strategy" (like the "What ifs?" about the survivability of the actually well-protected Minuteman Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile silos), and concentration on the highly survivable sea-based portion of the country's nuclear deterrent.* Fallows also more broadly suggested the United States "get more help from our allies," and most radically of all, that the U.S. limit the portion of its armed forces not devoted to the Europe-centered NATO mission of defending Western Europe from Soviet attack to "a modest policing force" for "a very short-term, limited policing and peacekeeping function"--with this not only a matter of saving money by not bothering with a "capability" from which the country will not benefit, but heading off the mistake of "another Vietnam" by ruling out such interventions for simple lack of the means.6 (As Fallows puts it the U.S. armed force were structured for "a war and a half," with the "war" the hypothetical Soviet attack on Western Europe, and the "half-war" forces intended to be the disposable force for meeting any other contingency that emerged, such as supporting South Vietnam had been. The cuts he recommended would have turned the U.S. armed forces into a "one war and modest policing" force too "modest" to wage another Vietnam War.)

Approaching this case critically one may be impressed by how much Fallows says, and what he proposes--his call for sharp force reductions especially striking. Yet the more critically-minded will be struck by what he does not say, does not propose, because of what he implicitly accepts--not least the politically orthodox view of the necessity of a massive, far-beyond-minimal nuclear deterrent and the stationing of massive American conventional forces in Europe, in the name of the Cold War. Fallows' only concern is with the more limited problem of fulfilling this mission he takes as a given, while Fallows gives his more radical suggestions short shrift in the piece. Fallows' call for dramatic force cuts gets a mere half page in his eighteen page article, and indeed he seems to all but bury it in his list of suggested "fixes," as he concentrates on the less contentious and "safer" matter of weapons procurement. Moreover in doing so Fallows presents the sole obstacle to the conventionally unobjectionable demand of making sure the armed forces get the weapons they really need as the prevalence of questionable ideas ("managerialism," "technologism")--of "theories" and "ideology" leading decision-makers astray--as he eschews any sort of structural criticism not only in regard to the prevailing reading of the international situation, but the more domestic matter of the political economy of defense. The economic and political-economic imperatives encouraging defense contractors, like businesses of every other kind, to "sell what they want to sell," and giving them the political influence that enables them to get civilian and military officials to buy it--which mean that not only contestable ideas but also very powerful interests and institutional imperatives stand behind the technologism and the thought of nuclear war Fallows criticizes--does not come up at all in the article.

Fallows' retreat from discussing the fundamental political task to simply ask how the task taken as a given might be done, as he accepts the ends unquestioningly and concentrates on the means instead; if occasionally seeming willing to countenance more than that (like the not-so-modest "modest policing force" proposal), overwhelmingly directs his attention to what he would have us take as "common sense" solutions that tweak rather than overhaul existing structures (as with his suggested "triage" system for weapons acquisition); his suspicion of structured thinking (theories, ideology, etc.) as the obstacle to the more "common sensical" path he advocates, even at that lower level of means; and his disinclination to look at the existence of any material interests behind the prevailing ideas; are collectively highly telling. Rather than the protest movements against war and militarism of the time still evident after the Vietnam War (the opposition to reinstitution of the draft, the nuclear arms race, intervention in Central America), Fallows' case bespeaks the thinking of the political center, with its conservative aversion to radical critique, embrace of the Cold War, and orientation not to solving problems because they are indeed problems but rather to sustaining societal "consensus" behind the status quo, by when discontents over a problem threaten that consensus, attending to the problem (or at least, being seen to do so) to the degree and for the length of time necessary to prevent those discontents from undermining the consensus--in this case, the country's more fundamental military posture.

With these realities in mind it is only fair to say that Fallows' position--and the position of the Movement of which he was representative--can very easily seem a centrist's characteristically "safe" way of appealing to a public in the post-Vietnam period disaffected with America's highly militarized foreign policy for the sake of channeling that disaffection into safe paths in the manner to which centrists conventionally incline (What could be safer than demanding the country equip the troops for their job as well as it can?) as they sought to shore up the flagging "consensus" behind the country's Cold War-era military posture. All of this is underlined by, reflective of the center's "civil" and "pluralistic" aversion to calling out such interests as they display a high tolerance for what others would call "corruption" in high places (blunt reference to which the centrist regards as uncivil, "ethical" politics, "populist" rabble-rousing, "class warfare," etc. at odds with their "pluralistic" politics), Fallows' taking care to avoid raising the matter of "special interests" (i.e. defense contractors) in the situation. And in the combination of the evasions of significant realities with the raising of potentially significant changes--even the "lowest common denominator" matter of the significant alteration of the Pentagon's colossal weapons procurement such, while sharp force cuts intended to head off "another Vietnam" by tying the hands of policymakers are more clearly so--can seem less really serious calls for change than a matter of gesturing at them to give credibility to a speaker who, while not necessarily desiring and possibly even opposed to those changes, believes no one will call their "bluff," the better to achieve that channeling function.

Given such a reading of the Movement one may hypothesize that in the absence of the pressures such as the Vietnam- and post-Vietnam-era protests, and the desire to channel them in a safe direction, the Movement would vanish, with the period of the end of the Cold War affording a convenient test of the hypothesis. After all, the Cold War's conclusion brought a moment in which pressure for significant changes in defense policy could be effective because of the disappearance of the rationale for the Cold War military posture; and in a time of alarm over the budget deficit, deindustrialization and unmet domestic needs greater than they had been a decade earlier, greater pressure to achieve savings in the area of defense spending. Indeed, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn described the situation as producing a state verging on panic over the possibility of "apocalyptic" cuts at the Defense Department in early 1990. However, the Movement's members flinched from publicly considering the implications of the Soviet military's disappearance eliminating the justification for the country's superpower military posture--the "one war and modest policing force" having lost its "one war" and leaving a case for just the "modest policing force" that Fallows had been prepared to float in 1979.** Considering that muted response it is undeniably the case that many of the most immediate concerns of those criticizing the forces were on the wane as the nuclear arms race at least appeared to be coming to an end, and the wars in Central America drawing to a close, a development which could be expected to make the task of channeling dissent into safe paths less urgent. Meanwhile what had been "safe gesturing" in the direction of major reforms some years earlier no longer looked so safe as it was more likely to have real consequences, consequences the generally change-averse centrist did not necessarily desire (the more in as, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Cold War posture was never just about the Soviet Union, but rather a function of a great many domestic and foreign imperatives that did not all vanish with the Berlin Wall's fall, from the requirements of bearing the military burden of maintaining the "open world economy" on the logic of "McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell-Douglas" as Thomas Friedman was to put it later, to "military Keynesianism").

Moreover, all of this converged with how within the political mainstream the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 seemed to, through a brilliant performance by U.S. forces, "debunk" the Movement's criticisms of the Defense Department's practice (all but validating "technologism"); restore the legitimacy of military interventions of the Vietnam type, as the prospect of more of the same provided a rationale for retaining a quasi-Cold War military (invalidating the "modest policing force" vision); and delegitimize dissent against the armed forces and military action in the way epitomized by the slogan "Support the troops"; with the Movement's response to these specific developments, again, revealing.*** Inimical as all this was to its program, had its members been deeply persuaded of and committed to their earlier calls for reform the new "conventional wisdom" was not unanswerable. The triumphalist view of the performance of American weaponry and practice in the Gulf was not invulnerable to challenge, given the extreme weakness of Iraq's opposition to the coalition's assault, with all that meant about the robustness of the "test" of that weaponry and practice that Iraq provided. Moreover, not only with the benefit of hindsight but even at the time one could argue that the 1991 Gulf War contained the seeds of a quagmire that those who took seriously Fallows argument about the dangers of enabling policymakers with a penchant for foreign interventions could easily regard as exactly the reason to limit the country's armed forces to "a modest policing force." However, the MRM's champions refrained from making any such arguments--again, because a Movement designed to channel dissent into a safe path was the less necessary in a context where dissent seemed less urgent, or more cowed, than before--while being associated with a Movement in any way critical of the forces was a political liability in a way it had not been before. (Indeed, where the supposed validation of American "technologism" by the war is concerned one could argue that those less than committed to the Movement's position found less reason than excuse to abandon their old argument.) And indeed, it is notable that the country's next President, a leader of the aforementioned Neo-Liberal wing of the Democratic Party so prominent in the MRM, who on the campaign trail criticized the incumbent administration's vision of post-Cold War defense restructuring as merely inappropriate "Cold War thinking on a smaller scale" while promising more fundamental change yielding greater savings on defense spending, when actually in office, presided over a once-in-a-generation reform that left his predecessor's plan largely intact, and the Cold War force with it, complete with the managerialism, technologism and even the thought of nuclear war Fallows described so many years earlier, in what can be described as "Cold War thinking on a slightly smaller scale."

Putting it bluntly the end of the Cold War, of which the Gulf War was a part, by changing the broader political circumstances (demands for change in the country's military posture) even as the essential problem and its burdens remained (the muscle-bound superpower still muscle-bound, so to speak), called its centrist supporters' bluff (on Capitol Hill, in the press, etc.), and thus revealed the Military Reform Movement as for many of them a ploy that had outlived its usefulness and which the politically canny thus set aside. Underlining this is how those elements of the Movement really committed to any kind of reform like the Fighter Mafia, went on making their case for the reform of weapons procurement, and no longer finding a forum for it in a mainstream "liberal" publication like the Atlantic, made their case in the radical alternative media outlet Counterpunch--because by the twenty-first century the mainstream of the American media had ceased to be willing to platform even its relatively modest questioning of the Pentagon's acquisitions philosophy. Indeed, in spite of not one but a succession of military interventions widely regarded as mistakes and failures from Afghanistan and Iraq forward; far graver concerns over the ability of the U.S. military-industrial base to meet the American armed forces' needs than were ever seen in the era of the MRM now commonplace; and the questions that new types of missiles and drones have raised about the continued viability of weapons platforms like mechanized ground forces reliant on masses of large armored vehicles and large warships American defense planners have long favored as the basis of the country's conventional forces; the inhibitions against such criticism remain intact four decades on. Thus in the 2020s one cannot discern even the beginnings of a show of protest to compare even with the limited and ultimately failed Movement of the post-Vietnam War era, let alone anything at all likely to accomplish what the earlier Movement so signally did not. * The six changes Fallows suggested in his article are, precisely, 1. "Forget about Minuteman survivability—and the MX"; 2. "Concentrate on submarines"; 3. "Get more help from our allies"; 4. "A modest policing force"; 5. "Use the triage system for weapons"; 6. "Train leaders and soldiers for combat, not management." ** Indeed, some of the Movement's supporters had discussed even more radical courses than Fallows, Charles Peters putting the U.S. withdrawing its forces from Europe altogether on the table—in 1982, with the Cold War still on, in his "A Neo-Liberal Manifesto." *** The Cockburns cite a "casual" April 1990 conversation with a "seasoned Pentagon official" who explained that given its then relatively vast tank force and substantial air force, combined with its distance from the U.S., a "threat" from Iraq was one of the few plausible justifications for America's retaining Cold War-level military capabilities in the post-Cold War period ("proving" the need for its mechanized-armored forces, air power, long-range airlift, etc.). and thus "outs" from under the budgetary pressure they were under; that such officials greeted the arrival of the "threat" that summer with relief, dubbing "Operation Desert Shield" "Operation Budget Shield"); and that providing such a justification factored into the Bush administration's determination to resolve the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis militarily. Cockburn et. al.. While the slogan "Support the troops" implied that dissenters had the freedom to protest the government's policy so long as they "supported" the troops, any criticism of the troops' mission was by definition "not supportive," while not incidentally evoking the right-wing myth of "soldier-hating" anti-war protestors in the Vietnam era, making it a roundabout but effective way of silencing dissent. For a critical view of the slogan, and the myth, see Jerry Lembcke's The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam.

The Culture War: Four Propositons

In the interest of Internet user-friendliness, a handy list. The propositions read as follows:

1. The Culture War was an Elite Project From the Start.
By this I do not mean that the sociocultural conflicts the culture war addresses were wholly manufactured. However, I do think it safe to say that the political right's leaders
1. Deliberately exacerbated the grievances of the public over issues like the Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade decision (actually uncontroversial at the time), in part by linking specific grievances to the politics of status and identity in a manner already old in the late twentieth century. 2. Combined the differing issues they deliberately inflamed opinion over (abortion, gay rights, etc.) into a larger conflict between "traditionalists" and "secularist-progressives" that they imbued with a significance more than the sum of its parts, converting disparate arguments into a culture war, and 3. Foregrounded the culture war as the central issue of the time with an eye to diverting attention from economic concerns on which the right was unwilling and unable to make concessions to public discontents, with this tying together, foregrounding, elevation of the issue again redounding to the intensity of feeling.
Pat Buchanan's famous "Culture War" speech of 1992 is exemplary of such usage of the relevant sentiment in its combination of disparate issues (abortion, gay rights, public funding of religious schools, censorship of pornography, the admission of women into Army combat units) into a single larger fight, a "cultural war" that was "about who we are . . . what we believe . . . what we stand for," "as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself," making "this election . . . about more than who gets what."

2. The Culture War was Inherently Extremist.
Our commentators and politicians bandy terms like "extremist" irresponsibly, and often cynically, but the term has long had an intelligible meaning within the post-World War II American political discourse. It denoted someone who could not be accommodated within the conception of "legitimate discourse" propounded by those we think of as "in the center"--which insists that political debate be interest-based and pluralistic, pragmatic and civil, and consensus-minded so as to keep down the temperature of controversy, and avert the dangers of division, radicalization, and the conflicts that can come from it through everyone regarding themselves as just one interest among many, and those interests respecting each other as all essentially legitimate negotiating their concerns one at a time as the respect "unity" and "consensus" as paramount. American politics, of course, rarely came close to this Platonic ideal, but there is no denying that the culture war was blatantly at odds with it. Rather than a politics of interest which treated other actors as legitimate, it was a politics of values which regarded those who disagreed with it as illegitimate. Rather than pragmatically, civilly negotiating it was central to the culture war that its proponents tied different concerns together and made them part of a larger struggle they themselves declared to be a war (some civility, this)--all as there is no question that the culture war was not just brazenly divisive, but often deliberately so, as they cast unity and consensus to the winds.

3. In Spite of its Extremism the Center Accommodated and Indeed Colluded in the Culture War.
Given that the culture war was so obviously outside the bounds of legitimate discourse as the center understood it it is only natural to wonder why the center eschewed treating it as such--why instead of taking the hard line against it that it has, for example, the demands of the left, it accommodated itself to culture being shifted to the center of politics in exactly the way the culture warriors wanted. Its doing so reflects two aspects of the center's conduct, then and later, namely 1. The center's highly touted opposition to extremism (for which the term "horseshoe theory" is shorthand), reflecting the reality of the center's deep conservatism, was in the main fierce opposition to the left, as it gave extremism on the right a pass, and 2. The center, like the right, decreasingly willing or able to address popular economic discontents given its embrace of neoliberal/neoconservative economic and social policy, saw shifting the focus of political disputation from the economy to culture, from class to cultural divisions (and the associated politics of status and identity) as also advantageous for it. Thus did the politicians of the center, rather than refusing to have any truck with the culture warriors, reach across the proverbial aisle to them while admonishing those who objected--all as a generally centrist media, consistent with its modus operandi regarding the far right as Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon described it, "normalized" the culture war as it deflected attention from the extent to which it was an elite project, trivialized or euphemized its objects (the extent to which reaction or bigotry may have been involved), and even amplified its demands. (Thus would one never have realized the extent to which the controversy over abortion was made rather than spontaneous--all as they would imagine from the coverage a country evenly split over the matter, or even one in which a Not-So-Silent Majority opposed Roe vs. Wade, rather than the reality of consistent, often significant, majority support for abortion rights down to the present polling has indicated--all as they popularized the vision of an America divided not between rich and poor, but "Red" and "Blue.")

4. While the Culture War Never Achieved its Deeper Purpose, it Has Nonetheless Done Much for its Initiators.
Those on the right who launched the culture war, and those in the center who enabled them for their own purposes (and their essentially common purposes as conservatives/neoliberals/neoconservatives unwilling to address popular discontents with the economy and more broadly devoted to the status quo), never quite succeeded in making the public forget the economy and concentrate on culture. Quite the contrary, the mantra that "It's the Economy, Stupid," validated when Buchanan's Republicans lost the 1992 election, has remained valid ever since, not a single election turning on the culture war, and indeed attempts to make elections about it ending badly for those making the attempt. (Thus did the Republican Party, exploiting the culture war in the form of their attempted impeachment of Bill Clinton, find their ambitions thwarted in the midterm election of 1998. And thus did a Democratic party running on a neoliberal economic platform against a Republican party increasingly identifying itself with economic nationalism lose in 2016, and 2024.) Still, there is no question that in the efforts to foreground culture and divisions over it they did succeed in diverting attention from, indeed blocking attention to, economic and socioeconomic concerns, at the expense of those desiring change and to the benefit of those resisting it. In doing so they made life harder for the left in particular--because in the mainstream mind it was now identified with identity politics instead of class politics, which meant that it suffered the opprobrium of those who, even if potentially open to its appeal on class and economic grounds, despise the politics of identity (little knowing that the left actually opposes them!), all as leftists had to devote much of what time and energy and resources they had to trying to correct the misapprehension (and from what I can tell of the conventional wisdom, generally failing). By contrast, given the continued determination of the Democratic Party to refuse to address popular economic grievance, or even to fight the culture war as seriously as their opponents do (choosing "civility" even as their rivals do not), the right, if far from getting all it wanted, has been the great beneficiary in the situation--as shown not only in its electoral strength, but its setting of the policy agenda, and shifting politics ever rightward after itself as dissent toward the status quo gets channeled either into still more identity politics (rather than an Occupy Wall Street or an anti-war movement, Black Lives Matter, until in 2020 it proved to have outlived its usefulness), or the right (as seen in the Tea Party and what it helped to pave the way for, Make America Great Again). All of this has made American politics at the 250th anniversary of the country's birth a very, very different thing from what they had been, in their actualities and seeming potentials, from what they had been at the 200th, way back in 1976--not that the thoroughly presentist commentariat occupying the mainstream platforms (and insuring others of different views are kept off of them) would ever suggest such a thing. After all, using history to understand the present is not what the so-called pundits do, all as in spite of the fact that many of them were alive back then 1976 A.D. may as well be 1976 B.C. from the standpoint of their frames of reference.

The Politics of Celebrity

NOTE: The following items (What is Celebrity? A Definition," "The Politics of Celebrity," "The Politics of Celebrity Gossip") were originally going to be three separate posts. Since they were not very long, and very similar in theme, and followed so readily from one another, I decided to just put the three items together in a single post for convenience's sake.

What is Celebrity? A Definition
One might think of "celebrity" as a status in which an individual is not only well-known to the general public, but of interest to it for particular reasons and in particular ways. There is an expectation that they are known for positive reasons, and perceived positively, with admiration and affection related to their being superlative in some ways (in skill, accomplishment, some personal quality, etc.). However, it is also the case that the way in which they are superlative, or the area of life in which they are superlative, tends to be associated by ("stodgy," "puritanical") cultural authority with "frivolousness." One may also add that the affection and admiration of the public extends to an interest in them personally--in their personal life, such that gossip about it is of interest to a wide audience, and indeed the basis of a significant media industry trafficking in such gossip (as the profusion of tabloid journalism demonstrates).

Considering the matter is this one way one can see that many who are famous are not celebrities. A famous criminal despised by the public is not a celebrity, however fascinating they may be to some in other ways. A scientist may be well-known and highly regarded for their achievements, but these are not ordinarily considered frivolous, and popular affection and personal interest of the kind described here not ordinarily part of the package. Rather the description tends to fit persons in the world of the arts, entertainment and sport, especially insofar as the activities are popular--less the novelist or sculptor than the actor or singer, less the world champion in a sport aired only on "the Ocho" than one which fills stadiums and regularly draws audiences of tens of millions on television.

In that connection with entertainment one sees a suggestion of a key aspect of celebrity, performance. The scientists who has made a breakthrough in their field is not seen at their work by public--nor even the novelist or sculptor. The public only knows the result of their work, and especially where the matter is science, or to a lesser extent, high culture, the public only knows that the result is significant because authority tells it so. By contrast the public sees the actor, singer, athlete do what is supposed to make them superlative--the actor, singer, athlete, performing it before their eyes. And if likely to be swayed by hype, critical claquing and much else, nevertheless much better able to judge for themselves the performance, which can touch them very personally. Not everyone may be equally impressed, but those who are impressed are likely to be genuinely, personally so, making them into fans such as those who may be admired for other reasons (like scientists) tend not to have.

Moreover, the aspect of performance extends beyond what the celebrity does for their audience to their whole public persona, their life as a public figure, for they are "that thing they do" in extreme degree--at once one-dimensional and larger than life as they are likely to fill some established niche, like the tough guy action hero or the sex goddess, whose "lifestyle"--a word that for once can be correctly used here--is supposed to match the screen image, not just lavish and glamorous, but entailing a particular flavor of glamour consistent with that larger-than-life one-dimensionality. (Thus does the action star drive a Hummer for no practical reason whatsoever, but just because that is what big tough guys who beat up people on screen do. Thus is the sex goddess' bedroom and bathroom exactly what people would expect of a sex goddess.) One may add that the glamour significantly extends to their sex life--the more in as the celebrity is conventionally expected to be attractive, a "sex symbol" (in the case of the screen sex goddess, this is very central indeed to her celebrity stature, superlativeness in physical beauty and sexual allure in fact a basis for celebrity many a time), and have "high-profile" personal romances with other superlatively attractive celebrities. In all this these ways celebrities, who "have what you don't," embody fantasies for the public--fantasies of being some desirable thing in extreme degree and becoming rich and famous because of that, as well as the fantasies of luxury, fantasies of privilege, and yes, the fantasy of sex that are part of its mystique.

So altogether:
Celebrity is a kind of fame achieved by those regarded as superlative in some respect in a mass audience pleasure-giving area of life such as popular art, entertainment or sport. This typically entails performance on the part of the celebrity, whose public persona is expected to be of a piece with the performance in ways extending to a glamorous and luxurious "lifestyle" aligning with said persona, and entails "fan"-like admiration, affection and interest in the personal life of the performer on the part of a wide audience, exemplified by the attention afforded them by tabloids.
In all that one may also sense why some see celebrity as in decline today. The fragmentation of popular culture to which the digitalization of media is presently contributing means that there are fewer movies, shows, events, anything that "everyone" can be said to be following at one time, all as their involvements in them may be shallower--the old-fashioned "fan" perhaps less often seen. Certainly the way film production has changed has made the endurance of old-fashioned film star status questionable, all as the decline in the prominence of spectator sports within popular culture from what they were a few decades ago means that the sports hero is not what they were, the more in as the "media ecosystem" that permitted champions in one field to expand their profile beyond it seems a thing of the past. It may be that popular music is a rare exception to the pattern for now, certainly to go by the prominence of Taylor Swift, but it seems that the trend is likely to catch up the singers in time, the more in as concert-going is ceasing to be affordable for the so-called "middle class," all as it is hard to think of any act that shows promise of ever matching Swift's fame . . .

Meanwhile, wokefied mainstream opinion's extreme hostility toward anything suggestive of traditionalism in gender, and especially to anything that would conventionally appeal as "sexy" to the sensibility of (the male) half of the population, has not sat easily with the "sex symbol," and all the rest that sex did for celebrity--and I suspect celebrity has suffered accordingly in this way as well. It also seems to me that the quasi-celebrity of, for example, the reality star (often superlative at nothing), and the online influencer (not only not superlative, but trafficking in the illusion of "relatability") has cheapened the fantasy of celebrity--while in a hard-bitten era, many may be less responsive to the selling of such fantasy more generally. Feeling more strongly that there is "us" here and the privileged "them" there, rather than finding in such personages an escape from their dreary existences, seeing celebrities, thinking about them, is a reminder of how crummy their life is that they can well do without.

The Politics of Celebrity Culture
Considering the politics of celebrity it may be well to start with a definition of celebrity. Here is what I have been able to come up with:
Celebrity is a kind of fame achieved by those regarded as superlative in some respect in a mass audience pleasure-giving area of life such as popular art, entertainment or sport. This typically entails performance on the part of the celebrity, whose public persona is expected to be of a piece with the performance in ways extending to a glamorous and luxurious "lifestyle" aligning with said persona, and entails "fan"-like admiration, affection and interest in the personal life of the performer on the part of a wide audience, exemplified by the attention afforded them by tabloids.
As one can see from this characterization of celebrity the concept, with its setting up a few for admiration and reward far above the many on the premise of their superlativeness in some degree, is inherently inegalitarian and elitist. One may also add to this that celebrity culture, in fostering popular affection toward, fascination with, identification with, at least part of a society's elite, serves to accommodate the public to the existence of inequality, reinforcing it. (Celebrity has the virtue of usually going along with youth, and exceptional attractiveness, charisma or charm, a far cry from what the business-and-politics power elite are apt to possess--they call it "Showbusiness for ugly people" for a reason, folks!--all as the celebrity's privilege can seem remote from such things as "surplus labor extraction" and "financial parasitism," the recording artist who got rich off of music sales as a result of working people freely paying for their songs capable of seeming a comparative innocent even in the eyes of a self-described communist.) This is all the more in as celebrity culture is connected with a culture of "You can do it too!" aspirationalism that has those discontented with their lot, rather than thinking about how society might be fairer to the disadvantaged, pinning their hopes on and pouring their efforts into personally becoming one of those greatest beneficiaries of a generally unfair and brutal system, and in the meantime believing themselves only "temporarily embarrassed billionaires." (Certainly many a person, especially the 99 percent-plus who have neither capital nor connections, picture becoming a famous actor, singer, writer as their best chance to really rise above their lousy lot in life.) One may add that celebrity also serves to promote interest in the cultural activities in which people became celebrities, helping sustain enthusiasm for popular culture, and sports, and unavoidably the value systems that they teach--again, apt to be status quo-affirming--the more easily in as there is so much in the makeup of the artistic and athletic mentalities that inclines them to the prevailing conservatism broadly in their work (the content of movies, songs, etc.), as they also readily lend their names, faces, time, effort, to conservative causes. Altogether this makes celebrity culture not just deeply conservative, but a prop to conservatism.

Such a conclusion may seem surprising given that from a "traditionalist" (stodgy, "puritanical," etc.) conservative cultural standpoint there may be much wrong with celebrity culture. There is its misanthropic suspicion of that which is "trivial" or gives pleasure generally, the more in as its content is so often "sensational," "salacious" or "irresponsible," the more in as it is to be enjoyed by working people--who in their view are not merely working people because they must sell their labor, but because they exist to work for the profit and comfort of their "betters"--and that they prefer those working people keep their minds on their work, on raising the generation of workers which will replace them (as those alert to the natalist concern understand, this is what "family" is all about for them), and the indoctrination which keeps them in their places and performing the function they allot to them (hence "faith" as well as "family"), all as they just plain begrudge the lower orders any and all comfort or happiness. There is also the plain and simple snobbery about "low" cultural "junk," the stronger for the broader elitism of the sensibility, and the anti-modern and antiquity-loving bent of so much conservatism.

Nevertheless, however widespread and far from unimportant this life-hating outlook is, few take it to its logical conclusion, with elites historically less averse to culture and sport than that. Quite the contrary, rather than opposing them their concern has tended to be to exercise control over their content, and indeed that desire what really stands in back of the severe, disapproving traditionalism, which has been such a useful tool for this purpose. By and large art has been ruling-class art, subsidized by elites to meet their personal tastes, or serve their political ends, such as propagandizing the many with the "right" ideas, as is to be seen in ways ranging from the iconography of temples, to the enlistment of Hollywood in contemporary war drives, all as they have long been sophisticated users of the star as spokesperson. Popular sport has even more thoroughly served their ends as a training not so much in the edifying mind-set and habits of "teamwork" and the like, but, as Thorstein Veblen had it, clannishness and truculence, in personal force and will ("He got it because he wanted it more") and superstition as the explanation of life's outcomes, making for a solid training in nationalism, militarism, and in more obscure ways, even religiosity. For his part Victor Klemperer was entirely right to remark the place of the "sports hero" in Nazi culture, while it does not seem at all accidental that Cold War America represented the high point for sports in American life. (Meanwhile the debased form of celebrity that reality TV offers flourishes in significant part because of its highly conservative content.) And indeed one may be struck by the way in which the idea of celebrity has been dragooned into the service of the most traditionalist of all institutions--as with the idea that providing a Britain where "We don't have a Hollywood!" with a celebrity culture justifies the retention of the royal family with all its power, privileges--and symbolism.

Altogether looking at a media outlet such as the Daily Mail I cannot help being struck by how it combines a heaping helping of the crudest sort of tabloid trashiness (recall how in their banner they arranged the faces of Beyonce Knowles, Kim Kardashian, Miley Cyrus, Victoria Beckham in almost Mount Rushmore-like fashion, a Mount Rushmore of the contemporary tabloid universe?) with the crudest sort of right-wing propaganda. The reality that conservatism of various kinds so much dominates the media makes comparison difficult, but meager as the left-wing media deserving of the name are I certainly do not know of any left-wing publication that attempts to hook readers with the latest on the Kardashians for the sake of getting them to listen to or read their take on the climate crisis or the Iran War. And indeed I suspect that if they tried to do that their target audience would laugh them off in contempt.

The Politics of Celebrity Gossip
Taking up the subject of celebrity culture and its politics a while ago it seemed plain enough that in its elitism and inegalitarianism, and its making elites and the existence of privilege itself attractive to the public, making the public even identify with them and hope to participate in what they have like so many "temporarily embarrassed billionaires," celebrity culture is inherently conservative. Accordingly lending itself very well to reinforcing cultural institutions promulgating conservatives attitudes and values (from professional sports to reality TV to "the British crown), it has in its effect been even more so. However, that does not quite exhaust the subject, with the actual content of so much celebrity gossip seeming to me to merit a word when we discuss the political implications of the phenomenon.

Consider what it is that the gossip-mongers tell us about the relevant personages. They give us stories of their rise in the world--telling us of how "ordinary" people just like ourselves got their "big break" when someone recognized something special in them and they became "overnight successes" like they "never dreamed of becoming." They tell us of how hard they work and how smart they are as they enumerate how they are a thousand things besides the one thing we know them for ("I don't just act and sing and dance, I'm a businesswoman and a philanthropist and an activist and an author!") every one of them Renaissance men and women who would be on this year's Nobel Prize winners list were they not grubbing for roles in crappy films of no value whatsoever. They tell us of the glamorous lifestyles (the word may be safely used here) those people now have--and how it can all go awry, as they tell us of the troubles that come with money, especially when a person inexperienced in handling large sums of it, especially when young, gets hold of a lot of it, exposing them to the dangers of self-indulgence, which might destroy them ("Too much, too soon," was a favorite cliché of the hack journalist, once upon a time), but which they might also overcome through personal "grit" and "faith" as, having "lost everything but got what is real" they come to appreciate "what really matters in life," which isn't the career and fame and glamour and luxury (even as they hold on to all those things for dear life).

Those who have thought at all seriously about the propaganda campaign the rich and their champions have waged against awareness and appreciation of the significance of class in America for the last two hundred years should easily recognize in all this drivel a compendium of its clichés. In the nobody who became a somebody because of that big break, the self-made man, who "proves" that social background is no advantage, or barrier, to "success" on the level playing field that is our meritocracy, on which talent and hard work will always show itself, always be respected, always have its reward, the more easily in that opportunity is everywhere. In the idea that "You can do it too!" and cease to be a temporarily embarrassed billionaire by becoming the real thing, because what's stopping you, after all? In the idea that in this way as in so many others the rich aren't different from you and me, except for their being hard-working and smart in the way you haven't been--else why are you down there and they up there?--but that at the same time they are probably not happier than you, probably less so, because of the tragedies that so often mar their existence, all as at any rate the enjoyment of wealth is fleeting ("shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations" the old cliché of a political line that ever downplayed the existence of such a thing as Old Money). All as while they are at it they give us a lecture on the evils of drugs and sex, and the virtue of religious belief, and generally the belief that the vileness of human nature is such that one must be ever kept down, their hands busy, the temptations out of reach if they are not to harm themselves or others, and practice in sitting in moral judgment on complete strangers of whom we know nothing.

The intelligent can only sneer, as they consider how unlikely it is for someone really born a nobody to become a somebody in Hollywood, how in this world very far from being a level playing field meritocracy rich in opportunity for all social privilege and outright nepotism not only played a large part in the making of those careers, but were often a sine qua non of them--all as they cannot but be struck by how shabbily defensive the beneficiaries of the system, like all other privileged persons, get, as if they really were victims of persecution, when anyone points out the reality (witness Jamie Lee Curtis' particularly self-pitying, obnoxious, foolish conduct). How for all the talk of their hard work--and some of it is admittedly hard, the long hours and physical discomfort of shoots, the sometimes grueling training--as is the case with even the hardest-working rich man that ever was a great many others work just as hard as they do, indeed harder, under far worse conditions, for far less in return, with far less choice about the matter. (Yes, it was painful getting into that costume. Ever mined coal, though? Gone down into the sewers as a maintenance worker? Toiled in a steel mill? Given the choice of that instead, which would you take?) And the talk of their "smarts" ("Smarter than you, smarter than you!" the media taunts us in line with its ultra-reactionary Social Darwinist prejudice and hatred of equality) proves just as specious, as their supposed Renaissance Man and Woman accomplishments fail to stand up to scrutiny, often a matter of mere dilettantism, or lending their names to other people's projects (lending their name to a fashion line, attending a dinner, accepting the byline on a ghostwritten book or article in an industry where Names count for everything and writing ability next to nothing ), all as a good many of them only remove all doubt as to whether they are a fool when they open their mouths, as they do far too often. Certainly in their attention to the sufferings of the rich they know all too well that there is nothing in those sufferings from which the poor are exempt, with indeed the rich getting every indulgence, every protection, such that they are permitted to survive and even thrive in the wake of what is likely to end the life of a poor person--and those understanding this groan at the ceaseless encomiums to "grit" and "faith" when the recognition for their "recovery," their "comeback," should go to lucre as they can only consider how very little attention the (vastly greater) sufferings of poor persons get by comparison with the sufferings of the rich who can far more easily rid themselves of their riches than a poor person can rid themselves of their poverty if they so desired, yet somehow never do. Indeed, even in the face of the complete ruin that is a rarer thing than the hype would have one believe, the celebrity is apt to have their money manager and their portfolio of assets giving them a share in our casino economy's paper profits, all as if really wiped out they can just write a tell-all or do another reality show or run for office, fame an asset they still have and which makes hard times a very different thing for even the much-mocked "D-lister" than for the true "nobody." And of course there is what this mountain of crassness and incoherence adds up to, the message that "No matter how deprived or repressed you are, how limited and unsatisfying your life, be grateful you are not them," even as you are enjoined, obliged, pressed, to strive upward economically, not least because it is so glorious to be them--incoherence all too much of a piece with the life-denying bourgeois outlook that one must sacrifice everything on the altar of "success," yet abstain from actually enjoying anything it brings them. Given all that it seems all too predictable that it is in the publications of the right, not the left, that blend gossip-mongering and propaganda.

Drone Warfare and the Return to Rat's Alley

In the nineteenth century the banker Ivan Bloch anticipated that another great European war would produce an attritional, brutal, bloody stalemate between the belligerents that would end with state collapse and left-wing revolution. This was not an oracular pronouncement on his part, but a thoroughly considered assessment grounded in long study of the advances in firepower, fortification and mobilization of Europe's military systems evident in his time, and the structure of the alliances through which those militaries were connected. And the result was such that in hindsight we can judge it to have been, in a way giving the lie to the ever-fashionable stupid sneering of the epistemological nihilists about the impossibility of trying to understand the world and where it is going, exceedingly accurate.

Indeed, the more far-seeing of Bloch's day found his case powerfully argued and highly persuasive, and such as H.G. Wells, standing on the shoulders of the giant, glimpsed things still further off. However, those who actually had any power at all regarding the policies of nations dismissed Bloch's warning, frankly because what Bloch told them was simply unpalatable to them. After all, that great power war had ceased to be anything but an instrument of national suicide was unacceptable for elites, addicted as they were to Malthusian-Social Darwinist misanthropy; slaves as they were to the imperatives of economic and thus also imperial expansion in an age of "finance capital"; and attached as they were to martial pomp and circumstance, not only as a function of the "persistence of the Old Regime" of landowner-warriors as the officer class, and, even more perverse, the insistence that war as essential to society's "hygiene" and health. The collective effort of war, after all, forced "unity" on the nation, bringing out the revivifying "best" in a society going "slack" and decadent"--which is to say that they were ever eager for those occasions in which they could set aside the democracy for which they had such distaste, divert the have-nots from concern for their unmet needs and violated rights, demand their subordination to those they told them all the time were their "betters," and give the security state an excuse such as peace did not afford them to crush with an iron fist those who did not obey (outlawing strikes, jailing dissenters). Additionally, as Thorstein Veblen had it, the mobilization for war gave all directly involved, above all the young men subject to the brutality and brutalization of life in uniform, a "training in ceremonial precedence, arbitrary command . . . unquestioning obedience," and in respect for and subordination to "rank" and "authority," which conditions the individual to servility--which is exactly how those in charge like it. And if war could be bloody, well, those elites' combination of Medieval contempt for the lower orders with that very nineteenth century Malthusian-Social Darwinism meant that those "leaders" were not squeamish about spilling a little, or a lot, of proletarian blood, the better to thin out the ranks of a burgeoning, unruly, dangerous working class--decreasing a particularly unwanted portion of the "surplus population." All in all, it was a win for the status quo and its greatest beneficiaries in that way that had George Orwell reminding his readers that whoever the foreign enemy is supposed to be at the moment, it is the proles the rulers are fighting first and foremost and always--a view most certainly affirmed by the historical record as Jacques Pauwels demonstrates in his all too fittingly titled The Great Class War, 1914-1918, not least in the attitude generals genuinely deserving of condemnation as sociopathic as well as monstrously incompetent displayed as they ordered millions of young men to "go over the top," and how they responded when so many of them left their bones in No Man's Land.

Looking at the killing fields of Ukraine, and what the drone has done and is doing now here and on other global battlefields, it seems that large land wars must, again, be protracted World War I-like contests, effort from which today's "generals" and "statesmen" seem no more likely to shrink than their predecessors of a century ago. Quite the contrary, they show themselves as eager for such as they have ever been as they gleefully tell their publics that their "vacation from history" is over, that the "peace dividend" from the end of the Cold War can no longer be paid out (as if they ever got it, as if spending wasn't rebounding by the time of the Kosovo War and especially after 2015 overtaken Cold War levels in real terms!), that (not as if they haven't heard this one before) the welfare state is no longer affordable and such frivolous nonsense as care of the sick and aged must be sacrificed for the "greatest public benefit of all," the preparation for war, War, WAR! which requires that the lower orders SHUT UP about their problems getting through the day and rally round the flag.

Of course, were the "generals" and "statesmen" of today to look at how the delusions of the "generals" and "statesmen" of 1914 ended they would not be nearly so cavalier about such a course, but they regard themselves as "elected to lead, not to read," and even where they do read it isn't the likes of Pauwels that they do read. Rather it is the right-wing revisionists who have been rehabilitating the First World War, spinning its victims into "heroes," remembering whom in the interviews promoting their Establishment crapola they wipe away a tear from their eye in sentimentality over the "patriotism" of those who "laid down their lives for their country," rather than sadness for those mass-murdered by their "leaders." You get more truth in an episode of Blackadder Goes Forth--which is why Michael Gove-like Upper-Class Twits of the Year hate it so.

Further Thoughts: What Made the Greatest Generation "Greatest?"
Considering the '90s mania for "the Greatest Generation" it helps to remember that two world wars and the arrival of the nuclear age did not cure the right of its belief in the virtues and necessity of militarism and war for the health of a nation. This is because of what the right fears and hates even more than it can ever hate the destruction war means, egalitarianism, especially as manifest in the ability and willingness of the have-nots to demand their rights. For the right it is not war but egalitarianism that is the disease, and militarism and war a cure--because it diverts attention from social questions, affords excuses to rein in democracy and civil liberties, and exacts "sacrifices" from those have-nots they think still have more than they deserve (all as in victory and sometimes even in defeat wartime means that the haves get to look forward to becoming have-mores as government cracks down on organized labor, hands out its contracts, and even temporary victory brings its spoils). Such is the "unity" the right so extolls--the word in the mouth of an Establishment speaker on this occasion or any other invariably meaning the disenfranchised not join hands with their more privileged countrymen in "compromise" of the kind that the "consensus" addict so much sings, but rather the unconditional surrender for which consensus is so much a smarmy euphemism as in the name of unity and consensus the poor do not let their "selfish" ideas about their "needs" get in the way of the selfishness of the rich.

During the Cold War the country had its militarism and its war, often war-of-a-kind, but not infrequently hot wars too. It was not all the right would have liked, even a Ronald Reagan not aggressive enough for the "invade Nicaragua!" crowd, but all the same, they largely got their way here. And if they were ecstatic over the fall of the Soviet bloc they rushed to declare The End of History the end of the Cold War left a void, one you can see neocon thought-leaders whining about in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Of course, there were ways to fill it, and in which they did fill it, insuring that the post-Cold War armed forces and their place in American life were really just "Cold War thinking on a smaller scale," and in the extolling of what Emmanuel Todd was to call the "micro-militarism" of the intervention-packed '90s, as "militainment" drenched pop culture from video gaming to television shows.

There was also the promotion of reverence for the militarism and warfare of a past era, ideally the one that came closest to their ideal of unity," World War Two, or rather their myth of World War Two, in which on hearing of the bombing of Pearl Harbor America's young men, in a fit of nationalistic rage and Johnny Rico "I'm Doing My Part" spiritedness, rushed to the recruiting stations without prompting, and the country rallied around the Leader (not the Leader they would have preferred, but the War Leader all the same) as it girded itself for a years-long struggle against the Enemy, without dissent or a peace movement, without misgivings about shoving Japanese-Americans into concentration camps, or the restrictions and deprivations on the home front that saw the profits and assets of Corporate America and the super-rich wax great on the basis of taxpayer-built plant as working people watched the rise in the prices of daily necessities outstrip their wages, or the incineration of foreign civilians by bomber fleets en masse, just the conviction that we were the Good Guys and the Enemy the Bad Guys and patriotic "sacrifice" in a "Get it done!" spirit as those young men who rushed to the recruiting stations "Yes sirred!" MacArthur and Patton all the way to V-J Day and the big ticker-tape parade, hooray! A war the more convenient because many in the younger cohorts which participated in that war were still around, living examples to the youth--to, with the help of Messrs. Brokaw and Ambrose be held up to them as the greatest generation because of that Yes-sirring and Getting-it-done in gleefully invidious contrast with the Gen X slackers of the ironic and extreme '90s, a generation cynical rather than revolutionary as F. Scott Fitzgerald had it and so not so threatening as the youth of those horrible, horrible '60s who weren't so cynical (and indeed the right was eventually to fall in love with Gen X, for their conservatism and conformism and privatism as they helped make Silicon Valley the hope and darling of the oligarchs), but still their cynicism a distant second-best relative to the earnest patriotism they really wanted to see in them. And so, the more easily in as the side of the war that Mailer and Jones, Heller and Vonnegut (veterans of the war all) presented made little impression on the imaginations of a generation that read less and read less well than its forebears, they gave them their version of World War II, which reached them even if they never read Brokaw or Ambrose (again, they were not readers), while the claqueurs of the media helped make sure that Terence Malick's take on the war got a lot less viewers than Steven Spielberg's, and it may be that Medal of Honor and Call of Duty had an even greater shaping effect on the minds of the young than that.

So far as I can tell the historical consequences of all that have been little parsed by our "intellectuals"--what, for example, all the encomiums to the Greatest Generation meant when war came in the twenty-first century, whether the example the right so wanted to give them had the desired effect, and what it meant for America's politics. However, it seems clear that the attitudes of the young changed, for reasons in which the propaganda of war and the reality of war were but one factor. There is, of course, a great deal of disputation about the nature of the change, reflected in how we have moral panic about the supposedly crisis-afflicted young adults of America in every conceivable flavor. Thus do what pass for "liberal" publications warn their readers that Andrew Tate is father figure to the current generation of young men, while the publications of the right instead panic their readers that they think about their personal "gender identity" as if it were merely a Baskin Robbins' flavor--thirty-one to choose from!--or even just giving up on adulthood generally to spend all day playing video games in their parents' basements and trying to become lawfully wedded to the glorified autocompletes they deludedly think are their "girlfriends.") Still, for all the incoherence and sheer stupidity evident in the portrayals there is perhaps the grain of truth that amid everything that is going on in the world in this age of polycrisis making what has for so long been the conventional wisdom look ever more fatuous, something's gotta give.

Of the 2026 Midterm Election

The commentariat widely expected that the 2026 midterm election would see the Democratic party make significant gains at the expense of the Republicans.

This expectation did not require any great thought on their part. Midterm elections usually see the party holding the White House take a (usually, well-deserved) beating as voters express their outrage over the ways in which those they elected betrayed them. (Indeed, it can seem that voting the scum out of office is the only satisfaction the voter gets in a system where policymaking is all too demonstrably oligarchical.) Exceptions to this rule have been few indeed, all as such reversals for "the party in power" are especially severe in years when said party, at a time of economic hardship for the many, was brazen in betraying its promises, and indeed worsened the pain of the public with its actions as it snarled "SHUT UP!" in their faces--as, after promising action on the "affordability crisis" on day one, and a policy of peace, the Republican party most certainly delivered the opposite since the election of 2024. (Indeed, one can hardly avoid being struck by how a President who, as Max Blumenthal reminded his readers, gained critical support in the early part of his bid for the presidency through his denunciation of the Bush the Second administration's neoconservative march through the Middle East and attacked the 2003 invasion of Iraq as "the worst decision we ever made" delivered another war of--not the people's--choice in the Persian Gulf in the name of curbing the threat of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" through the overthrow of a long-demonized regime that quickly proved not to be the easy "regime change" promised at the outset, and then determined to "stay the course," even as the consequences for the world proved far graver, and certainly the consequences for the American citizen more immediate.) Still, the media's response to the outcome of the election has been astonishment at how severe the Republicans' losses have been. Reporting the "flipping" of seats across regions and levels and branches of government they tell us again and again how Democratic party politicians have got elected in districts and states where this had seemed nearly unthinkable as they use over and over again such words as "landslide" and "historic," all as those inevitably lamenting the event, speaking of a near extinction-level event," find their words getting a lot of play.

Hearing such words I become instinctively suspicious. After all, our media, and its preferred "experts," have not exactly distinguished themselves as having a capacity for "big picture" and "long term" thinking. Quite the contrary, they shun such things, even while being prone to hot-take-diarrhea-of-the-mouth--worsened by their sensationalist impulses and associated propensity for being at once vague and hyperbolic. This deficiency was certainly on display when they covered a different election in 2024 they described as a landslide--the British General Election, which the media described Keir Starmer as "winning" by a landslide, setting the stage for a new era in British politics. In fact what really happened was that the vote for the two major parties was exceedingly weak, with the vote for the Tories collapsing, as rather than the votes not going to them going to Labour (which won in 2024 with less of the vote than it lost with in 2017 and 2019), third parties were the beneficiaries. Indeed, the far right Reform UK seemed potentially on the verge of eclipsing the Conservatives as Labour eclipsed the Liberals in the years after World War I--all as Starmer's Labour, so much damaged by his betraying his early posturing as a socialist/social democrat from very early on in his tenure as party leader as he revealed himself a Blairite, with a Manifesto to match, seemed to me to have only a very weak base of support, with all that meant for Starmer's chances of still occupying 10 Downing Street come 2029. Everything I have seen since has only affirmed that reading of the situation, as Reform UK waxed powerful--and helped Starmer's opponents on the right take advantage of the Jeffrey Epstein scandal to see Starmer out the door barely two years after his taking office, with Andy Burnham never showing much promise of representing a meaningful break with what Starmer delivered (and that less and less all the time as he sends the British air force to the Middle East).

The precedent seems to me meaningful for 2026 not simply as a reminder of the illiteracy of our "experts," but because the 2026 election was less a triumph of the party of opposition than the collapse of a party of government that had deeply alienated the public. The American electorate voted against the Republicans, much more than it did for the Democratic party, which has conducted itself very much in line with its tradition of recent decades of trying very hard to not stand for anything--and succeeded in part because in contrast with the British system there was that much less room for third parties. At the same time one ought not go too far in overstating just how much of the vote the Democratic party got in the circumstances, appreciating which it seems to me fitting that we look at the election to the House of Representatives as a way of putting the matter into perspective. After all, in contrast with the state level races this one gives us the national picture--and more clearly than the Senate race does because where only one-third of the seats in the upper house of Congress are up for challenge in any election, every seat in the House is that every two years. At the last count the Democratic party had won some 257 seats, with the possibility existing of their picking up a few more with a handful of races as yet "uncalled," suggesting in any event a rough three-fifths of the House. But what does that really amount to in American politics?

At this point a little history lesson is in order. As it happens, from the 1932 election that brought in Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and ultimately the New Deal, to 1992, the Democratic Party won a majority in the House in every election save those of 1946 and 1952, with the latter translating to near-total predominance for sixty-two years, and in the later period predominance for thirty-eight straight years. Notably that predominance survived the departure of the conservative Democratic South for the Republican party, and the ups and downs of the turmoil of the late '60s and '70s (the divisions over the Vietnam War and anti-civil rights backlash, the ways in which James Carter disappointed working people, etc.), these troubles narrowing but not eliminating the Democratic party's lead, which remained considerable. The post-Watergate bump they benefited from so much in 1974 and 1976 apart (which gave them over 290 seats in that period) they averaged 256 seats from 1966 to 1992, with the last year seeing them close to the average with 258 seats in the 1992 election.

The 1990s saw the Democratic Party's position collapse, however, in a way from which it has not recovered since, with 1994 a signal year here, the Democratic Party going from 258 to 204 seats in a single year--a loss of 54 seats, over a fifth of those it held, in just one election, paving the way for the Republicans winning a majority of the seats in the House in the next five elections. (Indeed, looking at the figure below, showing the distribution of seats in the House from 1962 to 2026, you can see how the Democratic party's position went off a cliff in 1994.) Of course, the Democratic Party finally won a majority in the House in 2006, but this did not usher in a new era of Democratic predominance. The party won majorities in the House in only four of the next ten elections, in 2008, 2010, 2018 and 2020, with of these majorities only 2008 seeing it achieve the kind of preponderance that in the pre-Clinton era it took for granted (257 seats), with the next election already seeing a pointed drop (to 242), the majority party turned into the minority party in the one immediately after that, with a virtually unheard of mere 201 seats in 2012, and still worse than that in 2014 and 2016, and their average consistently far lower than it had been over the twentieth century (214 in 2010-2024, reflecting the norm of their slight or nonexistent control).

Figure: Seats in the House of Representatives by Party Affiliation


It seems to me that this history poses an obvious question, namely will the Democratic party's far from unprecedented position here prove the beginning of a prolonged dominance of the House, or will it prove a blown chance such as what was seen in 2006-2010? Answering that I direct you to what exactly happened at the key turning points, with the events of the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 exemplary. Conventionally attributed to the efforts of the Republican leadership in bringing about that outcome, like most major victories it is inconceivable without real blundering on the losing side, with key to the success of the '94 "revolution" how newly elected Democratic President Bill Clinton betrayed his supporters. Admittedly when one considers Clinton's platform one finds it studiedly vague in important ways, its text appealing to public anger amid what was then "the worst economy since the '30s" over "Reaganomics" while not being too clear regarding what he would offer as an alternative--the expert able to recognize in him a "Neo-Liberal" who would likely govern as a neoliberal. (Indeed, Clinton did not hesitate to display a good deal of "Big Government"-hating conservatism here, and in hindsight to mark himself as the prototypical Third Way-flogging hustler that the likes of Tony Blair would emulate.) Still, "Slick Willie" at the least left room for those not looking too closely or critically at his record and statements to mistake him, if not for the Second Coming of FDR, for a producerist-nationalist who would offer some corrective to the preceding disastrous twelve years of thoroughly neoliberal Republican administration, whether in addressing the country's increasingly financialized and deindustrialized economy, or the shortfalls of its social safety net in areas like health care. However, he instead forwarded his predecessors' neoliberal policies with great gusto, doing much that he had claimed to oppose (going all out fighting for free trade agreements, giving a pass to violators of financial laws), and kicking to the curb what he had promised to do (health care reform, address of energy and the environment), in an economy that went on financializing, deindustrializing and shortchanging working people. Moreover, as he went about it, when he was not decoying the simple-minded with stupid stunts like his Attorney General's bluffing Hollywood about the Federal government getting tough with it unless it cleaned up its act with regard to violence on TV, he offered patronizing lectures about politics as the art of the possible, with (very centrist, this) the only thing that was possible giving oligarchs what they want as others get "I feel your pain"--and then when people didn't buy it, he said "Look" in that tone he used when showing irritation and impatience with inferiors, and repeated the same insult to their intelligence as he jabbed his thumb in their faces.

Admirers of grubby political maneuvering were impressed by this. Perhaps it is impressive. Certainly if one regards the goal of the political center as thwarting the demands of progressives and working people (as indeed it is), well, Clinton did that brilliantly by getting himself into the White House while destroying the public support for the party that from the standpoint of the "conventional wisdom" represented the "progressive" alternative to the fire-breathing right in lasting ways, giving his equally centrist successors an excuse to plead helplessness in the face of the right as indeed they not only enabled but pushed the continuation of the neoliberal program. And indeed, in spite of the grief the right gave him while he was in office (including the absurd and disgusting attempt to impeach Clinton over a personal indiscretion), he was feted and rewarded for it, as one is reminded considering how where after leaving office Jimmy Carter devoted himself to what one may sincerely regard as charitable works, Clinton kept a more rarefied company--as one sees when looking at that photo of him in Jeffrey Epstein 's indoor pool with Ghislaine Maxwell and "Unidentified Woman."

But few ever admit to this having been the Agenda, even for a Big Government-bashing, Old Liberal-hating Neo-Liberal hailed for being so in the New York Times itself by chief Neo-Liberal theoretician Charles Peters himself. Indeed, suggesting that centrist Democratic politicians can ever care more about stopping progressives than they do about winning elections (no matter how many, many times they blatantly do it) is the kind of thing that makes centrists sneer "conspiracy theory." So very well, let us for the moment accept that Clinton actually cared about winning elections for his party--by which standard he was a disaster for it from which his party did not even begin to recover for many, many years, and then less as a matter of its own merits than its rival party's demerits. Simply put, public disgust with George W. Bush's administration, largely in response to the war into which he had plunged the country (the war that, again, Donald Trump denounced as the worst decision the country had ever made), sufficed to make a good many people who had not done so in a while vote Democratic again.

But then Barack Obama, amid not just the war but an even graver economic crisis than the early '90s as the neoliberal utopianism of the '80s and '90s had its logical culmination in the wreck-the-world financial crisis in whose shadow we have all been living ever since, proved to be another centrist-neoconservative-neoliberal Democratic President who was to brag in his memoir about how he had stood for nothing at all, advised by the same pack of sleazy grifters who had filled Clinton's administration (e.g. that other friend of Jeffrey Epstein, the loathsome Larry Summers), and very predictably betrayed the country just as brutally and brazenly as his predecessor. (I remember seeing Matt Damon campaigning for Obama in person in 2008. His enthusiasm impressed me as genuine--without the qualification or reserve one might have expected from someone who personally knew and admired historian Howard Zinn growing up! Damon's enthusiasm was long gone by 2011, as he confessed in public--and Obama's retort as witless as it was shameless.) Unsurprisingly in 2012 the House was no longer Democratic Party-dominated, setting the stage for another round of Republican ascendancy(in much, much more than just the House in 2016, as the year's surprise presidential election outcome showed us), public backlash against an elected President who infuriated even his supporters, and another chance for the Democratic party in 2018, which made its admitted gains that its centrism-neoconservatism-neoliberalism-committed leaders blew yet again, even more quickly this time, leaving the party in the position of weakness from which in 2026 it is just reemerging.

As all this shows, those who voted Democratic in 2026, just as they did before, expect results, and whether people get them will decide whether 2026 is another 2008, or something more enduring, like the post-FDR majority. Considering that one has to take into account two factors. One is that if the Democratic Party has what looks like an impressive majority in the House it is not really better than it had many times in the past, even in the Obama era, when it did not amount to much, even in far more propitious circumstances. After all, not only is the Democratic lead slighter in the other house of Congress, where the prerogatives of Senators permit a minority the Republicans will clearly have to easily thwart a good deal of action, but the two other branches of government, the executive and the judiciary, remain firmly in the hands of the Republican right. From Donald Trump's reappointment of Stephen Miller to Chief of Staff, to Supreme Court Justices and Samuel Alito's making it clear that they will not be retiring anytime soon, they give little sign of willingness to make concessions to the discontents just expressed at the ballot box as they make the most of what is still a position very, very far from suffering "a near-extinction level event." There will thus be only so much that the Democratic Party's leaders can do with even the best will in the world--and such a will is not to be assumed on their part. For all of the attention claimed by the victories of progressive candidates the country over, from which progressives can take heart, in the extremely seniority-advantaging American legislature (conservative and change-averse as a feature, not a bug), the centrists-neoliberals-neoconservatives remain in charge, and it seems, unlikely to give the progressives any ground, certainly to go by Hakeem Jeffries. ("There will never be a moment where I bend the knee to hard-left democratic socialism." "Never a moment where I bend the knee?" Seriously? This is how you talk when facing an aggressor of overwhelming power, not a handful of junior members of your own party. And "hard-left?" To describe people simply calling for what Jimmy Carter, actually regarded as having been of the more conservative element in the party in his day, campaigned on?)

As things stand the Republicans seem likely to stay the course once again, and the Democratic Party leadership to enable them as they fight with "epic fury" against the progressives in their party while "reaching across the aisle" to the right no matter what it does not only in the name of "unity," "consensus" and all the rest of that claptrap, but under the pretext of its being all they can possibly do (such that they have to move right, right, ever to the right as they snarl at the progressives who would have it otherwise). Yet I do see the possibility of alternatives, with the most obvious the progressive elements in the Democratic Party challenging the prevailing centrists. This is all the more the case insofar as this encourages those in the Republican party those whose laments of their party's defeat, and the criticisms of the policies that led to it, are more than just an attempt to grab press attention, escape personal responsibility, attempt damage-control, gain an unwarranted reputation as a "maverick," etc. pragmatically "going their own way" in contrast with the deference they showed their party's leaders in the past, voting against the policies that have cost them dearly here than persisting in them.

I do not think any such reorientation of the parties to be very likely. As Ralph Miliband made clear, progressives are much more likely to become parliamentary rather than to make parliament progressive, with Alexandria "Woke 1 Was Crazy!" Ocasio-Cortez (no longer the newcomer, now a four-termer heading into a fifth) striking me as a contemporary reminder of that--the more in as the really progressive element seems very limited indeed for now. (For all we hear about the Democratic Socialists of America there are a mere seven of them in those 254+ seats the Democratic Party won, a scarce three percent of their own party, and that includes the aforementioned Ms. Ocasio-Cortez.)

Also not encouraging this is the tendency of American progressives to extreme complacency, and hasten to the conclusion that they have got what they wanted when they have in fact got nothing, have in fact left the field to an opponent who really was victorious, and afterward shrink from resuming the struggle. Consider how many times the end of neoliberalism has been announced since the bungle that was the Republican administration, down to the present. Consider how after the Republicans' ill-conceived impeachment attempt against Clinton many who should have known better (including Thomas Frank) rushed to pronounce the right's "culture war" as defeated, failed, finished. Consider how after the election of Barack Obama the opposition to the Iraq war evaporated, even as the wars not only continued but metastasized and spread, with Obama making "kill list Tuesdays" part of the rituals of the presidency, and Iraq followed by Libya, by Yemen, by Syria, and oh yes, the western Pacific and Ukraine, to almost no protest whatsoever.

Consider, too, how after the genuinely historic events of January 2021 progressives told (read: lied to) themselves that Donald Trump and "Trumpism" were finished as a force in American politics and even American life (thus was there silly talk of digitally erasing his cameo in Home Alone 2!), apparently little aware that in almost no time Trump would again be the candidate of a far more united and militant Republican party. Indeed, even with the Democratic Party once again sacrificing sound strategy and democracy itself to heading off any chance of a progressive candidate being on the ballot in a campaign that was a "greatest hits" edition of the electoral failures of the epoch, down to the very last Trump campaign rally in Madison Square Garden with all its dark evocations for many, its sympathizers discounted the possibility of Trump winning as they had eight years earlier, such that they were shocked when his victory in not just the Electoral Vote but the popular vote such as no Republican had had in two decades swept him into office, and he set about proving that the 47th presidency would not be like the 45th. Such is the grasp of HISTORY, even that history which has scarcely ceased to be current events, that our political culture, our media, promulgate, the more in as they also encourage the extreme shortness of attention span and susceptibility to distraction exemplified by the media's responding to the shootings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis and the spreading protests in their wake, and the looming war with Iran, by blasting us with "All Nancy Guthrie, All the Time."

In the rhetoric I see at the time of this writing I see such complacency yet again, complacency even less warranted than it seemed to be in 2008, given, again, that as Greg Palast correctly pointed out, the Democratic party's position in government is a long way from what it was even then, and the party not even giving the false impression of direction that it seemed to have when facing a global financial-economic collapse and the task of ending what Americans have since come to call not the "Iraq war" but the "forever war." Yet just as on those other occasions "getting fooled again" is what those celebrating the election returns seem to be largely doing, and it can be expected that all of those who care to see that everything the American public voted against continue will make the most of that, just as they have done on every one of the occasions I have just cited. Those wondering if this time the American public's vote will amount to more than an expression of opposition without policy consequence to show for it as everything they voted against just goes on and on are thus advised to watch for whether the complacency, the self-deception, and the acquiescence to which it ultimately leads are repeated in exactly that way elites are counting on, because they have so consistently got it in the past.

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